The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright by Bracha, Oren
OREN BRACHA
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited:
Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early
American Copyright
A B S T R A C T. The concept of the author is deemed to be central to copyright law. An
important strand of copyright scholarship explores how the development of modern copyright
law was intertwined with the rise of a new ideology of authorship as an individualist act of
creation ex nihilo. This Article remedies two common shortcomings of this scholarship:
implying that the process of embedding original authorship in copyright law was complete by
the end of the eighteenth century, and presenting the relation between the ideology of
authorship and copyright law as an exact correlation. These two shortcomings neglect the
complexity of the interaction between authorship and copyright law and attract the criticism that
much of modern copyright doctrine seems diametrically opposed to the presuppositions of
original authorship. This Article focuses on copyright law and discourse in nineteenth-century
America. It argues that much of the weaving of the ideology of authorship into copyright law
took place during this later period and in three main contexts: originality doctrine, the
emergence of the notion of copyright as ownership of an intellectual work, and the rules that
allocate initial copyright ownership. The result was the modern structure of copyright-
authorship discourse as a motivated distortion. Various parts of this discourse incorporate
conflicting images and assumptions about authorship, which often stand in tension with the
legal doctrines of copyright and their actual effects. These patterns, which still dominate
copyright law today, are traceable to the history of the power struggles, economic interest
motivations, and the ideological constraints that produced them.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright in the West, we are often told, is deeply entangled with the
modern notion of authorship.' Authorship is copyright's ghost in the machine.
In American culture, too, the author-as the heroic creator of original
intellectual works and as their rightful owner -looms large. The author plays
an important role in popular understanding of copyright law. He even left his
imprint on the U.S. Constitution, which vests in Congress the power of
"securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."2 Even in this postmodern era
during which the "death of the author" has been proclaimed countless times,3
we often continue to picture solitary authors creating original ideas ex nihilo
through their intellectual labors. This picture lies at the normative heart of our
vision of copyright.
Over the past few decades, however, legal and literary historians have
joined the broader scholarly trend of "deconstructing" the myth of the author.4
1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 2-3
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE Music TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath trans.,
1977); ANTOINE COMPAGNON, LITERATURE, THEORY, AND COMMON SENSE 31 (Carol Cosman
trans., 2004) (writing that Barthes's The Death of the Author "became the antihumanist
slogan of the science of the text, both for his partisans and his adversaries").
4. See COMPAGNON, supra note 3; Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in TEXTUAL
STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josu6 V. Harari ed.,
1979). The scholarship about copyright and original authorship is quite extensive. See, e.g.,
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 1; JOSEPH
LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR'S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002);
JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, BEN JONSON AND POSSESSIVE AUTHORSHIP (2002); MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) [hereinafter ROSE, AUTHORS
AND OWNERS]; PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (2003); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners:
Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain (pts. 1 & 2), 18 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS 1,
191 (1993-1994); James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37
AM. U. L. REv. 625 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
"Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright
and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1992, at 139; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the
Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 76 (1988) [hereinafter Rose, The
Author as Proprietor]; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 429
(1984).
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These scholars have analyzed the author as an ideological construct, traced the
joint history of this construct and modern copyright, and exposed the many
ways in which the myth of authorship as a solitary and individualist
production of radically new ideas conflicts with the social realities of creation.
They also have argued that modern copyright law and its fundamental
structures rest heavily on the social construct of the author.
Is the construct of authorship the key for understanding modern American
copyright law and its history? Yes and no! The myth of the author is indeed a
central element in modern copyright law, but as a matter of legal doctrine,
copyright does not directly rest on and, more importantly, never has directly
rested on this myth. The relationship between the law of copyright and the
myth of authorship is far more complex and interesting than recent history and
theory suggest. The purpose of this Article is to supply a better and richer
understanding of the relationship between American copyright and authorship.
The Article revises existing accounts of copyright and authorship by describing
the ways that concepts of authorship interacted with fundamental copyright
doctrines in America within a specific historical and social context - the crucial,
formative era of the nineteenth century.
The structure of my argument is as follows. Part I supplies a brief
introduction to existing scholarship about the history of authorship and
copyright. It argues that, alongside its important insights, this scholarship
suffers from several shortcomings. Most importantly, many existing accounts
assume that by the end of the late eighteenth century, copyright had become
infused with a specific image of creative authorship that still dominates it
today. The difficulty with this assumption is highlighted by the obvious
discrepancies between many fundamental features of copyright law and the
vision of original authorship that supposedly dominates it. I suggest that the
difficulty may be resolved and a better understanding of the relationship
between copyright and authorship may be gained by a close look at the
nineteenth century. During this period, original authorship concepts were
gradually embedded in the actual doctrinal structures of copyright in ways that
fundamentally transformed both.
Turning to the account of copyright and authorship in nineteenth-century
America, Part II begins by describing late eighteenth-century American
copyright as in transition from being a publisher's privilege to being an
author's right in her intellectual product. By the turn of the century copyright
was formally bestowed on authors rather than publishers or printers.
Copyright rhetoric flaunted original authorship and elevated it to the status of
a fundamental principle and ultimate justification. Yet the basic institutional
form of copyright remained unchanged. It was still the same limited economic
privilege of making and selling reproductions of printed texts as it was in its
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days as a publisher's privilege. During the nineteenth century, however,
copyright underwent a fundamental transformation. It was gradually reshaped
into a general right of ownership of creative works. While concepts of
authorship played an important role in this process, it was by no means the
unfolding or implementation of a preexisting theory of original authorship in
copyright doctrine. The intellectual and doctrinal constructs that emerged
during the nineteenth century were completely new.
The following Parts provide a detailed account of the development of three
central areas of copyright during the nineteenth century and their interaction
with the ideology of authorship. These Parts also explain the social context of
these developments, including economic, ideological, and cultural changes
characteristic of the emerging mass-market society.
Part III discusses the doctrine of originality. The legal requirement of
originality first appeared in American copyright law during the 182os. From
the outset, competing understandings of the requirement appeared. In one line
of cases, judges took originality seriously by imposing relatively demanding
and meaningful requirements of novelty or aesthetic merit as a precondition for
copyright protection. Another line of cases constructed originality quite
differently as a very minimal and narrow requirement. By the late nineteenth
century, two developments had occurred. The second line of cases was clearly
triumphant, and an extreme version of the minimalist understanding of
originality became the conventional wisdom among judges and commentators.
At the same time, however, originality was elevated to an unprecedented
rhetorical and formal status. Originality came to be seen as a defining principle
of the field and as a constitutional requirement. The result was the paradoxical
character of the modern originality requirement: the lower its practical bite as a
substantive threshold for protection sank, the more dominant its status as a
fundamental principle became.
Part IV describes the development of doctrines that define the character
and scope of copyright ownership as well as the overarching concept of the
intellectual work underlying them. It argues that at the end of the eighteenth
century copyright was a very limited exclusive entitlement to making verbatim
or near-verbatim reproductions in print. Gradually, the scope of protection was
abstracted and expanded to encompass a growing sphere of uses.
Complementing the expanded scope, a growing number of exclusive
entitlements such as translation and dramatization were added during the
second half of the nineteenth century. A new concept of copyright as general
control of an intellectual work that could take a variety of concrete forms drove
this process and in turn was fueled by it. As the traditional self-restrictive
character of copyright dissolved, new, more limited, boundary-setting
mechanisms appeared. In a society deeply committed to a political and moral
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ideal of uninhibited access to information, these mechanisms-most
importantly the fair use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy-
purported to ensure the free flow of knowledge in society. Ironically, the
broader and stronger copyright protection became, the more vocal grew the
insistence that copyright left all knowledge free as the air.
Part V explores the development of rules that allocate initial copyright
ownership. In contrast with the two other doctrinal contexts, the pattern here
was closer to that of gradual erosion. A regime that initially expressed rather
coherently the new eighteenth-century principle of the author's ownership of
his intellectual product came under increasing strain from economic interests
and the growing complexity of production patterns during the nineteenth
century. The early American copyright regime was consistent with its new
grounding in authorship in one basic but important way: authors were the
original owners of the rights protected by copyright. The creators of texts were
either the actual owners of legal rights in them or the source from which these
rights were transferred to others. During the second half of the nineteenth
century, the principle of authorial ownership gradually eroded. New
precedents involving production in hierarchical or collaborative settings
gradually allocated ownership away from the hands of actual creators. At the
turn of the century, this process culminated in two developments. In the
absence of an express contract to the contrary, a new judge-made default rule
placed ownership in the hands of an employer or a commissioning entity, and
the 19o9 Copyright Act's work-for-hire doctrine explicitly vested ownership of
employees' works in their employers. When this process was complete, the
most basic imperative of the authorship-based understanding of copyright was
clearly abandoned as an inadequate anachronism or was left as an empty
rhetorical shell. In numerous cases, authors were no longer the owners of their
intellectual product, not even as a formal matter. Still, even in this context
there were some remnants of the dominant representation of copyright in
terms of authorship. In some cases, individualist authorship tropes were
applied to the corporate employer in order to justify its ownership. In others,
authorial ownership was identified as a fundamental constitutional principle at
the same time as it was ignored or bypassed.
I conclude by highlighting some of the insights that nineteenth-century
history can teach about the relationship between copyright and authorship.
Modern copyright was formed in an interaction between concepts taken from
the myth of original authorship, material interests, and ideological influences
within a society undergoing rapid economic and social changes. The result was
an amalgam of conceptual structures at once heavily infused with notions of
original authorship and nothing like the enactment into law of the abstract
eighteenth-century theory. This enduring framework, I argue, is ideological in
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the sense of being a motivated mystification. It is a set of conventions that
constrains, shapes, and legitimates copyright discourse in ways that are
traceable to the power relations that produced it.
I. ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT LAW
According to the conventional wisdom, by the end of the eighteenth
century a new concept of the original author took over copyright and has
continued to shape it ever since. Despite the grain of truth in this proposition,
accounts that follow it are often incomplete or even flawed. Such accounts tend
to create the false impression that modern copyright is shaped in a direct and
unproblematic manner by the late eighteenth-century tenets of original
authorship. For the most part, they also tend to ignore the crucial period of the
nineteenth century when the concept of authorship was embedded in actual
copyright law. Filling in this historical gap is crucial for understanding the true
nature of the relationship between modern copyright and authorship and the
way it was created.
No brief summary can do justice to the rich, insightful, and diverse
scholarship about the history of authorship and copyright, but the narrative is
roughly as follows. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,5 there
gradually appeared in Western cultures an ideological 6 framework that
constructed a new representation of the creative process, the producers of texts,
and the relationship between such texts and their producers. Three unique
elements of this framework were individualism, originality, and ownership.
Compared to earlier times, the new concept of authorship was highly
s. The timing of the rise of the new concept of authorship is a matter of some disagreement.
Pamela Long, for example, has argued that "the fully developed concept" of "'intellectual
property' ... emerge[d] in the medieval period around the 12th or 13th centuries" and that
the connection to individual authorship in regard to material inventions was made in the
fifteenth century. Pamela 0. Long, Invention, Authorship, "Intellectual Property," and the
Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. & CuLTURE 846, 847-48
(1991). Exact periodization aside, it appears that most scholars would agree that the roots of
the new concept of authorship trace back to the Renaissance and that its gradual
development and spread extended for centuries.
6. The claim that the understanding of authorship was ideological has two possible meanings.
One meaning of the term alludes to the claim that authorship was a contingent social
construct. It did not simply elaborate or reflect the order of things in the world -the "real"
or the "natural" relationship between texts and their producers. Instead, it arbitrarily
privileged certain attributes and relations, while excluding others. See Foucault, supra note 4,
at 15o. A second meaning of "ideological" is being false or deceptive. In this sense, the claim
is that original authorship was a false, distorted, or mystifying representation of the realities
of the creative process. See infra text accompanying notes 344-347.
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individualistic in two related senses. First, it privileged to an unprecedented
extent the status of one individual, who would become known as the "author."
The individual writer of a text was singled out, sharply distinguished from all
others involved in its production, and assigned the status of the ultimate origin
of the text.7 A new, unique, and privileged relationship came to be postulated
between the work and its sole originator -the author. Second, the activity of
authorship was reconceptualized in individualistic terms, ignoring or
obscuring the collaborative and cumulative aspects of creation. At the extreme,
the author was represented as creating in perfect isolation, and the work was
8seen as attributable to one direct personal origin.
The ideal author was depicted in this scheme as radically original in two
intertwined ways. First, the notion of originality involved a strong connotation
of independence that was yet another incarnation of the idea that the author is
the sole and ultimate origin of the work.9 Second, originality also meant
novelty. Original works were understood as being completely different from
those already in existence. Originality in this sense was marked with a
supposed total break with traditions and existing materials, as opposed to their
reproduction, reworking, or development. The relation of the idealized author
to his work was thus equalized to that of the Creator and his Creation. The
ideal author was imagined as a creator ex nihilo of utterly new things.' °
The concept of authorship was soon bundled with notions of ownership
and claims to rights. During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
interested parties in various European countries - usually book publishers -
developed the new conception of authorship and employed it in their lobbying
efforts for achieving governmental privileges or favorable legislation. In
England the trope of authorship was used in the campaign that resulted in the
first general copyright act-the 1710 Statute of Anne." Behind the campaign
were members of the powerful Stationers Company that dominated the book
trade. The stationers, who tried to achieve a new protective framework, began
to incorporate the concept of authorship into their arguments. 2
7. BOYLE, supra note 4, at 54; Woodmansee, supra note 4, at 429; Martha Woodmansee, On the
Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 1, at
15, 16.
8. BOYLE, supra note 4, at 54.
9. Woodmansee, supra note 4, at 427.
1O. See BOYLE, supra note 4, at 56-57.
11. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710).
12. See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT To Copy: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775), at 31-50 (2004). Scholars
disagree whether the figure of the author was used strategically by the stationers to preserve
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The most powerful engine that produced authorship-ownership arguments
was the literary property debate. In this three-decade long series of cases that
started in the 1730s, the stationers tried to attain recognition of copyright as a
perpetual common law property right.13 The large volume of theorization
generated by this conflict in the form of counsel arguments, judicial opinions,
parliamentary speeches, and learned pamphlets was a powerful melting pot
that fused together legal doctrine, theories of property, and representations of
the creative process.' 4 The image of the original author was combined with
popular natural-rights theories of property in order to justify the notion of
copyright as property." Authors, whose mental labor created intellectual
works, were presented as owners, and the intellectual works were presented as
objects of property. As one contemporary writer put it, "Labour gives a man a
natural right of property in that which he produces : literary compositions are
the effect of labour ; authors have therefore a natural right of property in their
works.' 6 Despite the ultimate failure of the specific claim for perpetual
common law copyright, 7 the image of the original author as an owner that was
perfected during the literary property debate remained deeply engrained in
Anglo-American copyright thought. As Mark Rose writes, "By 1774 ... all the
essential elements of modern Anglo-American copyright law were in place."8
their traditional privileges in a changing world, or whether it was used as a rhetorical device
for attacking the stationers and breaking their monopoly. For the former view, see JOHN
FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN
BRITAIN 61-63 (1994); and BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT
REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) 6, 9 (Iris C. Geik et al. eds.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2005) (1967). For the latter view, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-44 (1968).
13. See, e.g., DEAZLEY, supra note 12, at 115-210; FEATHER, supra note 12, at 69-96; PATTERSON,
supra note 12, at 151-79; BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 19-42 (1999);
Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation ofAmerican Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of
Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983).
14. See, e.g., ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 4.
15. See, e.g., DEAZLEY, supra note 12, at 149-67; ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 4, at 5-
6; Rose, The Author as Proprietor, supra note 4, at 56.
16. William Enfield, Observations on Literary Property 21 (1774), reprinted in THE LITERARY
PROPERTY DEBATE: EIGHT TRACTS, 1774-1775 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974).
17. After a brief period in which common law copyright was recognized in England under
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 1378 (K.B.), the House of Lords rejected common law
copyright in Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
18. ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 4, at 132.
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With some notable exceptions,' 9 historical accounts of the rise of the new
ideology of authorship tacitly accept Rose's claim and usually conclude at the
end of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, legal scholars (and apparently
literary scholars) writing about history are seldom content to let it remain just
history. A common assumption in authorship scholarship is that the ideology
of authorship still plays a central role in modern copyright law.2" At this point,
the difficulties with the standard accounts become apparent. Typically these
accounts claim the continued relevance of original authorship by tracing the
historical narrative roughly until the end of the eighteenth century and then
shifting the discussion to late twentieth-century copyright law.2' Martha
Woodmansee provides an example:
Our laws of intellectual property are rooted in the century-long
reconceptualization of the creative process .... Both Anglo-American
"copyright" and Continental "authors' rights" achieved their modern
form in this critical ferment, and today a piece of writing or other
creative product may claim legal protection only insofar as it is
determined to be a unique, original product of the intellection of a
unique individual (or identifiable individuals).2
One would never catch a lawyer making that argument. Unless heavily
qualified, the last part of this quotation is simply dead wrong. No copyright
regime whose border wars of copyrightability involve telephone directories 3 or
guides of cable television companies 4 and whose default rules often vest initial
copyright ownership in faceless business corporations" could be plausibly
described as extending protection only to "a unique, original product of the
intellection of a unique individual."
19. See Jaszi, supra note 4. Jaszi's account focuses on the nineteenth-century developments of
authorship and copyright and in this respect is similar to mine. Jaszi writes, however, that
by the early nineteenth century, authorship's "array of connotations and associations was
essentially complete." Id. at 471.
20. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 4; Aoki, supra note 4, at 191; Jaszi, supra note 4; Lange, supra
note 4.
21. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP, supra note i, at 8.
22. Woodmansee, supra note 7, at 27-28.
23. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. V. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
24. Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F. 3 d 15o9 (11th Cir. 1997).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000); id. § 101 (containing the definition of"work made for hire").
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Contrary to the assumption that pervades authorship scholarship, many of
the central doctrinal structures of contemporary copyright law may conflict
with what are usually claimed to be the salient characteristics of authorship
ideology.26 It is especially troubling that those discrepancies occur in doctrinal
areas where one would expect the strongest correlation, such as originality
doctrine or rules that allocate initial ownership. If vital copyright doctrines
eschew the gist of the original authorship framework, then what is left of the
claim that this ideology still dominates current copyright law?
This difficulty is closely related to the gap in the historical account of
copyright and authorship. Leaping from the late eighteenth century, a time
when original authorship was supposedly completely victorious, to the present,
when it is assumed to still occupy a dominant position, is, to a large extent, the
source of the problem. When one discovers that the basic tenets of original
authorship are not directly reflected in central parts of modern copyright, the
natural reaction is to dismiss its relevance altogether. As for the historical
account, two alternative conclusions might follow. One possibility is that
authorship scholarship is simply wrong and that the ideology of authorship
never played an important role in actual copyright law. The other is that there
may have existed a golden age of authorship in late eighteenth-century
copyright law, but later developments of copyright doctrine and thought
eroded the importance of this element down to the point of insignificance.
Both of these conclusions are wrong. To see why and understand better the
relation between copyright law and original authorship, it is necessary to fill
the gap in the historical account between late eighteenth-century and present-
day copyright. When one closely examines this relationship and brings into the
picture the crucial period of the nineteenth century, what emerges is that there
had been neither a golden age of authorship in copyright law nor a general
erosion process. At the end of the eighteenth century, abstract conceptions of
authorship came to dominate copyright discourse and supplied its underlying
theoretical justification. Yet these abstract conceptions had almost no foothold
in the doctrinal and institutional details of copyright. During the nineteenth
century, elements of original authorship were gradually embedded in actual
26. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873
(1997) (reviewing BOYLE, supra note 4) (finding that explanations of copyright law based on
"romantic authorship" tell us little about the legal doctrine they purport to explain, do not
describe these doctrines accurately, and are incapable of explaining the change and
development in copyright law). Lemley suggests abandoning authorship as a central
explanatory device of the development of modern copyright law and replacing it with a
concept of property rights based on economic theory. My account differs from Lemley's in
that my aim is not to debunk authorship-based explanations, but rather to revise them and
make them more adequate for explaining copyright's past and present.
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copyright law but always in an incomplete, convoluted, and sometimes even
contradictory way. This process produced the modern copyright framework,
which simultaneously is pervaded by the ideology of authorship and has little
to do with it. I turn now to a detailed description of this process in the context
of nineteenth-century American copyright law.
II. THE PUBLISHER'S PRIVILEGE IN AUTHORIAL HANDS: AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Far from having all its essential elements in place, American copyright law
was in a state of flux at the end of the eighteenth century. By 179o, American
copyright had undergone important institutional transformation, and
American public discourse about copyright was permeated with previously
nonexistent concepts from the vocabulary of original authorship. At the same
time, however, many of the institutional details of copyright remained
unchanged. Copyright became the right of authors, justified in terms of
authorship, yet still bore the traditional institutional form of a publisher's
privilege.
The sporadic exclusive privilege grants occasionally given to colonial
publishers as encouragement for undertaking specific publication projects27
had nothing to do with authorship.28 Authorship discourse appeared and
quickly rose to dominance after independence. During this period, and for the
first time in America, authors began agitating for legal rights in their own
27. On colonial grants, see Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo American
Intellectual Property 251-56 (June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (on file with author). There existed neither general statutory copyright nor
common law copyright during the colonial period. Occasional scholarly references to
common law copyright in colonial America are inaccurate or misleading. See, e.g., 1 JOHN
TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 46 (1972) ("[I]t was
theoretically possible to obtain an English common law copyright in the colonies .... ");
Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S. 11,
12 (1975) (stating that American publishers "were protected by English common law
copyright and later by the British Copyright Act of 171o").
28. The exception of an author's claiming protection in his own work was William Billings's
failed attempt to attain legislative protection in Massachusetts for his book of psalms. This
episode, which came at the very end of the colonial period, marked the change that would
become apparent after independence. See 1 RUSSELL SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC AND
ITS BUSINESS: THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED YEARS 280-86 (1988); Rollo G. Silver, Prologue to
Copyright in America: 1772, in 11 STUDIES IN BIBLIOGRAPHY: PAPERS OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
SOCIETY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 259 (Fredson Bowers ed., 1958); Alan C. Buechner,
Book Review, 33 NOTES (Second Series) 284, 285 (1976) (reviewing DAVID P. MCKAY &
RICHARD CRAWFORD, WILLIAM BILLINGS OF BOSTON: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMPOSER
(1975)).
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works. These authors and their supporters, advocating individual privileges or
general copyright regimes, gradually adopted the original authorship
framework.
The image of an author as an individual who creates new ideas through the
power of the intellect and the claim of authors' rights, often referred to as
natural property rights, first appeared in the context of the state copyright
statutes legislated in the 1780s.29 In 1783, Joel Barlow-one of the first
beneficiaries of author's copyright in America-wrote to convince Congress
that "the rights of authors should be secured by law."3° His main argument
relied on the natural rights of authors. "There is certainly no kind of property,
in the nature of things," he wrote, "so much his own, as the works which a
person originates from his own creative imagination."31 He concluded that "it
is a principle of natural justice that he should be entitled to the profits arising
from the sale of his works, as a compensation for his labor in producing
them. '32 At the same time, Barlow made a utilitarian argument in favor of
"giving a laudable direction to that enterprizing ardor genius" and warned that
"we are not to expect to see any works of considerable magnitude. . . offered to
the Public till such security be given. 3
The same mix of imagery of authorship, natural property rights, and
utilitarian arguments can be found in virtually all twelve state copyright
statutes.34 Not all of them were as enthusiastic as the preamble of the
Massachusetts statute, which referred to the "learned and ingenious persons in
the various arts and sciences" and to the importance of the "legal security of the
fruits of their study and industry to themselves," concluding that "such
security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more
peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his
mind. 35 Even the more conservative statutes, however, included variations on
the same themes. 36
29. For a survey of these statutes, see Crawford, supra note 27; and 1 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 1:17, at 1-184 to 1-201 (2007).
30. IV PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, No. 78, at 370 (1783), microformed on
Microcopy No. 247, Roll 92 (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publ'ns).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 371.
34. The state copyright statutes are reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1783-1906, at 11-31 (Thorvald Solberg ed., rev. 2d ed. 19o6).
35. Id. at 14.
36. For an analysis of the state statutes' preambles, see Crawford, supra note 27.
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By the time the U.S. Constitution empowered Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries"37 and the 1790 Copyright Act was enacted, 38 two important
developments had occurred. First, in a very basic sense, copyright in the United
States became the right of authors. Copyright transformed from an ad hoc
publisher's privilege to a universal regime of rights bestowed on authors.
Second, copyright discourse was firmly grounded within the conceptual world
of authorship and saturated with its terminology. The author was singled out
as a privileged individual with a unique connection to the work-a sharp
contrast to the earlier colonial complete disregard of authors. Authorship was
understood as the process by which an individual spirit served as the ultimate
source of new original ideas. In the words of Barlow, the hallmark of authors
was producing "works which a person originates from his own creative
imagination."3" This depiction of authorship was intimately connected to a
proprietorship argument, according to which authors were entitled to property
rights in the fruit of their intellectual labor, either on a natural-rights or a
utilitarian basis.
At the same time that authorship came to dominate the theoretical and
abstract discourse surrounding copyright law, the institutional-doctrinal
details of copyright remained rooted in traditional pre-authorship patterns.
The rift between the new official ideology and actual institutional forms was
staggering. Original authors were celebrated as the raison d'&re of the regime,
but copyright had no mechanism whatsoever to identify either authors or
works of authorship. The newly recognized author's rights were often
described as "property rights," but copyright, far from bestowing general
control or even generalized control over an object of property, remained the
traditional printer's entitlement to print and sell copies of the product of the
printing press. The 179o Act described it as "the sole right and liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" a map, chart, or book.4' Finally,
the object of property, the "thing" owned, was understood to be the intellectual
work created by the author, but copyright law lacked any mechanisms for
conceptualizing such intellectual objects or for demarcating their boundaries.
Instead of ownership of intellectual works, the notion embedded in the
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. i, i Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
39. IV PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 30, No. 78, at 370.
4o. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, S 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
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traditional scheme adopted by the 1790 Act was that of an exclusive right of
making verbatim copies of a particular text.
In short, at the end of the eighteenth century, copyright remained the old
economic privilege of the publisher (now conferred on authors) wearing an
official rhetorical mask of authorial property rights. The gradual embedding of
authorship ideology in actual copyright doctrine took place only in the
nineteenth century. The remaining three Parts describe this process.
III. CREATION EX NIHILO?: ORIGINALITY
The notion of originality was one of the most fundamental elements of the
new concept of authorship. Thus, it is hardly surprising that one of the earliest
aspects of instantiating the abstract concept within concrete copyright doctrine
was a creation of a doctrinal originality requirement. It is widely known that by
the early twentieth century the doctrinal requirement of originality became, in
the words of Peter Jaszi, an image of the theoretical notion of originality seen
in "fun-house mirrors."41 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,42 decided in
1903, was the emblematic case in this respect.43 In the Court's opinion, Justice
Holmes drew upon notions of romantic authorship to uphold the copyright of
a circus advertisement poster against a claim that such works lacked the
requisite degree of originality to merit protection. He described the intellectual
work as "the personal reaction of an individual upon nature .... [that] always
contains something unique" 44 and invoked the figures of the great original
masters.4" At the same time, however, Justice Holmes reduced copyright's
originality requirement to almost nothing. He combined a content neutrality
argument, a market concept of value, and a stance of judicial abdication in
order to find that copyright had no threshold requirement of objective aesthetic
value. 4 6 Accordingly, a commercial circus advertisement poster -the antithesis
41. Jaszi, supra note 4, at 456.
42. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
43. See BOYLE, supra note 4, at 55; William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum-ein ausufernder
Rechtsberein. Die Geschichte des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of
Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in EIGENTUM IM
INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH [PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE] 265, 281 n.71
(Hannes Siegrist & David Sugarman eds., 1999); Jaszi, supra note 4, at 481-83.
44. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
45. Id. at 251-52.
46. Id.
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of the image of an original work in the romantic sense -was found to satisfy
copyright's originality requirement.47
Every student of American copyright is familiar with Bleistein. But how
exactly did American copyright law get. there? How did it transform from
having no trace of any originality requirement in 1790 to a situation in which
originality was recognized as a basic copyright doctrine but received a
restrictive and technical meaning? In answering these questions, I first describe
the gradual rise of originality doctrine in American copyright and then analyze
the various social factors that shaped this process.
A. The Strange Career of Originality
Originality doctrine was shaped by the dialectical interaction between
commercial interests and ideology. It appeared as a doctrinal concept starting
in the late 182os in various copyright disputes in which defendants argued lack
of originality in order to deprive copyrighted works of protection and escape
infringement charges. By that time, there existed a solid array of interests
against a demanding threshold originality requirement.48 Thus, the agents who
fueled the process of development were mainly motivated by commercial
purposes and probably had little concern for high theoretical ideals such as
original authorship. Authorship, however, had already acquired a dominant
position in the conceptual world of copyright law and its justifications. When
such interested parties came to make their case in a public legal forum,
authorship was one of the central sources of arguments on which they could
and, indeed, had to draw. The result was that the preexisting ideology of
authorship was reshaped by interested parties in order to fit their concerns. At
the same time, the arguments developed by these parties were constrained by
the need to use terms and concepts taken from the lexicon of authorship.
This process produced two different strands of originality cases. In the first
strand of cases, courts strove to create a highly restricted originality doctrine.
Arguments based on originality relied on the imagery of authorship. They
presented originality as a requirement that the protected work be substantially
novel, or as a minimal threshold of creativity and aesthetic merit. Judges in the
first strand of cases did not reject such assertions altogether. Yet they took
47. See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story ofBleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 77 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (describing the
background and significance of Bleistein).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 82-104.
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pains to construct the originality requirement in such a way that left little of the
romantic notion of originality as involving either novelty or merit.
The highly influential opinions written by Justice Joseph Story epitomized
this approach to originality. Faced with the novel arguments that originality
was a threshold requirement for copyright protection, Justice Story adamantly
refused to condition copyright protection upon a requirement of novelty.
While doing so he explicitly rejected the romantic vision of authorship as a
total break with traditions and as creation ex nihilo. In fact, in the 1845 case
Emerson v. Davies,49 Justice Story produced a vivid anti-romantic manifesto:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art,
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before. No man creates a new language for himself, at
least if he be a wise man, in writing a book. He contents himself with
the use of language already known and used and understood by
others. No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided
and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every
man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought
and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or improved
by his own genius or reflection. If no book could be the subject of
copy-right which was not new and original in the elements of which it
is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in modern
times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in
antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence."0
This was quite the opposite of a naive or uncritical acceptance of the
romantic ideal of authorship. Juxtaposing Justice Story's prose and
Woodmansee's claim that "a piece of writing or other creative product may
claim legal protection only insofar as it is determined to be a unique, original
product of the intellection of a unique individual""1 is sobering. Add some gloss
of literary theory to Justice Story's rhetoric about textual borrowing, and a
version of the poststructuralist critique of original authorship emerges,
complete with the relevant catch phrases.
49. 8 F. Cas. 615 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
So. Id. at 619.
51. Woodmansee, supra note 7, at 27.
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Furthermore, it turns out that Justice Story engaged in another common
poststructuralist maneuver of exposing the giant original authors of the past as
free borrowers, lenders, and recyclers of texts. In the words of Justice Story,
Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew from earlier as well
as contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning of his
profession; and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly
our boast as the brightest originals would be found to have gathered
much from the abundant stores of current knowledge and classical
studies in their days. What is La Place's great work, but the
combination of the processes and discoveries of the great
mathematicians before his day, with his own extraordinary genius?
What are all modern law books, but new combinations and
arrangements of old materials, in which the skill and judgment of the
author in the selection and exposition and accurate use of those
materials, constitute the basis of his reputation, as well as of his copy-
right? Blackstone's Commentaries and Kent's Commentaries are but
splendid examples of the merit and value of such achievements.5 2
Justice Story was equally firm in rejecting the other aspect of the romantic
version of originality: the latent assumption that real works of authorship had
to be not only new but also meritorious. "[W]hether to be better or worse," he
wrote in Emerson, dismissing an objection that the protected work lacked
merit, "is not a material inquiry in this case." Instead of any aesthetic merit
criterion, Justice Story turned to the market as the sole arbiter of value. "If
worse," he explained, "his work will not be used by the community at large; if
better, it is very likely to be so used. But either way, he is entitled to his copy-
right, 'valere quantum valere potest."'"3
Emerson and the 1839 case Gray v. Russell, 4 in which Justice Story used very.
similar prose, were highly influential and were frequently cited throughout the
century in treatises and judicial opinions."s Their cold treatment of the dogma
S2. Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619.
53. Id. at 621. "Valere quantum valere potest" roughly means "with as much value as he can
get."
S4. lo F. Cas. 1035 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
55. See, e.g., Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 982 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1691) (echoing
Justice Story's rhetoric and writing that many of "the plays of Shakespeare are framed out of
materials which existed long before his time, and were gathered by him from ancient
chronicles, and other dusty receptacles of antiquated literature"); Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 F. Cas.
195, 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 640); GEORGE TIcKNOR CURTIs, A TREATISE ON THE
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of original authorship is particularly significant when one realizes that these
early Justice Story decisions represent the first moments in which originality
doctrine was introduced into American copyright law. Rather than with a
fanfare of romantic authorship imagery, originality made its appearance in
American copyright doctrine wrapped in arguments about the interdependent
and the cumulative character of texts and about the market as the only criterion
for assessing value.
Before one concludes that the ideological vision of authorship was simply
rejected in this area of copyright law, we must turn to the second, very
different, strand of originality cases that began to appear almost at the same
time as the Justice Story opinions. These cases not only recognized an
originality requirement, but also showed willingness to fill it with meaningful
content. These interpretations of the originality doctrine, although obviously
falling short of the ideal romantic vision, created substantial threshold
requirements of either novelty or merit.
The 1850 case Jollie v. Jaques,6 for example, involved copyright protection
of sheet music of a composition named "The Serious Family Polka." The
composition accompanied a play named The Serious Family and was an
adaptation of a preexisting German tune. Justice Nelson held that "[t]he
original air requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music,
it is said, can make the adaptation." 7 The contrast of the "genius" of the real
original author with the "mere mechanic in music" is a striking example of an
interpretation, based on original authorship concepts, of the originality
doctrine. Justice Nelson went on to phrase the originality requirement in
robust novelty terms: "The musical composition contemplated by the statute
must, doubtless, be substantially a new and original work; and not a copy of a
piece already produced, with additions and variations, which a writer of music
with experience and skill might readily make."sS
LAw OF COPYRIGHT 173 (1847). Other cases employed the rationale of Justice Story's
decisions without citing them. See, e.g., Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 731 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896)
(No. 707) ("[T]he quality and grade of original work required by the courts under the
copyright statutes are very moderate."); Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103, 104 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1888) ("The originality, however, may be of the lowest order ...").
56. 13 F. Cas. 91o (Nelson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 185o) (No. 7437).
S7. Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913. Importantly, a year later in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851),
Justice Nelson introduced to American patent law what later became the nonobviousness
requirement. In Hotchkiss, Justice Nelson used terms very similar to those he used in his
Jollie opinion, explaining that a patentable invention must be the work of a genius inventor
rather than that of an "ordinary mechanic." Id. at 267.
58. Id. at 913-14.
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While Jollie stressed independence and novelty, the 1829 case Clayton v.
Stone, which denied copyright protection to a price catalog, emphasized
substantive merit. s9 The opinion explained that "[t]he literary property
intended to be protected by the act" should be determined by "the subject-
matter of the work," and found that a "price-current cannot be considered a
book within the sense and meaning of the act of congress. ''6, It did not go as
far as saying that the court had to evaluate the literary merit of a work in each
specific case. Relying, however, on the constitutional and statutory reference to
"author[s]" and the "promotion of science," the court singled out certain
categories of works as outside the scope of copyright protection:
The act in question was passed in execution of the power here
given, and the object, therefore, was the promotion of science; and it
would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to
consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as
falling within any class of them.
61
The court further explained that "[t] he title of the act of congress is for the
encouragement of learning, and was not intended for the encouragement of
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences."6' A mere price
list, it concluded "must seek patronage and protection from its utility to the
public and not as a work of science.
6
,
A long list of later cases continued to read some meaningful content into
the originality requirement, drawing upon both the Jollie insistence on novelty
and the Clayton demand for substantive merit.6' Even the 1903 Bleistein case
contained a dissent by Justice Harlan, who explained that being "unable to
discover anything useful or meritorious in the design copyrighted by the
plaintiffs in error," he could not extend copyright protection to "a mere
59. 5 F. Cas. 999, 1ooo (Thompson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
6o. Id.
61. Id. at 1003.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 319 (7 th Cir. 1897); Lamb v. Grand
Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1889); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25
F. 466,467-68 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885); Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 1OO (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882);
Ehret v. Pierce, lo F. 553, 554 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 188o); Collender v. Griffith, 6 F. Cas. 104
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3000); Scoville v. Toland, 21 F. Cas. 863 (C.C.D. Ohio 1848) (No.
12,553).
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advertisement of a circus., 6' Nowadays, if the editor is generous, the Bleistein
dissent makes it to the textbook version of the case, only to be regarded by
copyright students as a strange curiosity from the past. When it was written,
however, it represented a waning, but still important, line of precedents.
To mention just one other striking example, the 1867 case Martinetti v.
Maguire66 stands in stark contrast with the content neutrality stance espoused
by both Emerson twenty-two years earlier and Bleistein thirty-six years later.
The work at issue was a play named The Black Rook. The court described it as
a mere spectacle - in the language of the craft a spectacular piece. The
dialogue is very scant and meaningless, and appears to be a mere
accessory to the action of the piece -a sort of verbal machinery tacked
on to a succession of ballet and tableaux. The principal part and
attraction of the spectacle seems to be the exhibition of women in
novel dress or no dress, and in attractive attitudes or action. The
closing scene is called Paradise, and ... [it] consists mainly "of women
lying about loose" -a sort of Mohammedan paradise, I suppose, with
imitation grottos and unmaidenly houris.6'
"To call such a spectacle a 'dramatic composition,"' it concluded,
is an abuse of language, and an insult to the genius of the English
drama. A menagerie of wild beasts, or an exhibition of model artistes
might as justly be called a dramatic composition. Like those, this is a
spectacle, and although it may be an attractive or gorgeous one, it is
nothing more.
The court found that such a work was not "entitled to the protection of the
copyright act."6 9 Moreover, the court went a step further and reasoned that
even if Congress wanted to extend copyright to such works, it had no power to
65. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 253 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
66. 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9173); see also Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1903) ("Society may tolerate, and even patronize, such exhibitions, but Congress
has no constitutional authority to enact a law that will copyright them, and the courts will
degrade themselves when they recognize them as entitled to the protection of the law.").
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do so under the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution. The Court
explained that "[t]he exhibition of such a drama neither 'promotes the
progress of science or useful arts,' but the contrary. The constitution does not
authorize the protection of such productions."7
The development of originality doctrine during the nineteenth century,
leading to Bleistein, was characterized by a constant decline of the framework
represented by Clayton and Jolie and a steady rise of Justice Story's approach.
Eaton Drone's highly influential 1879 copyright treatise, for example,
contained a forceful assault on the Clayton decision.71 Drone explained that "a
more liberal doctrine now prevails '72 and that "the requirements of the law as
to the importance or value of a production are so slight that valid copyright will
attach to almost any publication, and to many that appear to be of little or no
consequence. "7
The originality requirement, however, was never completely abandoned.
Drone, for example, in the same sentence in which he explained that copyright
will attach to "any publication," was also careful to add that "not every
collection of printed words or sentences is entitled to protection. ' 74 Rather,
"[t]o be worthy of copyright, a thing must have some value as a composition
sufficiently material to lift it above utter insignificance and worthlessness. '7
No one seemed to have noticed the tension between these two statements.
Even more curiously, as the actual bite of originality doctrine as a threshold
requirement was sinking, its formal and rhetorical status in copyright discourse
was soaring. The more judges and commentators emptied originality of any
meaningful content, the harder they clung to originality and the more vocally
they celebrated its role in copyright law. The most conspicuous examples of
this rise in the status of originality were the Trade-mark Cases,7 6 decided in
1879. In this decision, the Supreme Court struck down the first federal
trademark statute as unconstitutional. Congress claimed that the Intellectual
70. Id.
71. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE
AND ART, AND PLAYWRIGHT IN DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 209-10 (photo.
reprint 1979) (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879).
72. Id. at 210.
73. Id. at 211.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
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Property Clause authorized it to legislate in the field.77 The Court, however,
seized upon the words "authors" and "writings" in the constitutional language,
made originality the centerpiece of the constitutionally granted power, and
invalidated the statute for creating protection irrespective of any originality
requirement. "If we should endeavor to classify [the trademark] under the
head of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong," Justice Miller
wrote, because "[i]n this, as in regard to inventions, originality is required." '
He explained that, "while the word writings may be liberally construed," it
covers only works "such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers
of the mind."79 The conclusion was that its lack of any originality or novelty
requirements took the trademark out of the constitutional scope of the federal
copyright (and patent) legislative power:
The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual
labor .... The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of
something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party
using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its use,
and not its mere adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right
attaches upon registration. But in neither case does it depend upon
novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought."°
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to dispense with originality, no matter
how "liberally construed." Instead, it elevated originality to the status of a
constitutional principle that defined and restricted Congress's power. In the
following years, the trend of interpreting originality as a fundamental principle
of copyright continued.8 1
What began as an implicit doctrinal tension at the moment that originality
was introduced into copyright doctrine had grown into a full-fledged paradox
by the end of the century. Copyright doctrine came to place originality at the
"7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
78. ioo U.S. at 94.
79. Id.
8o. Id.
81. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 57-60 (1884); Am. Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 265-
67 (C.C.D.N.J. 19o5); Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 F.
993, 994-95 (6th Cir. 19oo); Falk v. City Item Printing Co., 79 F. 321 (C.C.E.D. La. 1897);
Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 34 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893). The outcome, but not the premise that
originality has a constitutional status, was reversed in Bleistein.
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heart of the field, awarding it a privileged status, while, at the same time,
reducing the reach of originality doctrine to negligible dimensions. Originality,
in the romantic sense, became the foundation of copyright law. Yet copyright
law had little to do with originality.
B. Originality in Context
What accounts for this paradox? The process that led to this structure of
originality involved an interaction among various economic and ideological
factors. Authorship, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become
the official justification for copyright, was an important element of the process.
As litigants, judges, or commentators came to articulate the boundaries of
copyright protection, they naturally relied on concepts taken from that
theoretical framework. These concepts, however, were manipulated as
individual agents -motivated by economic interests and ideological
commitments-used them to construct legal arguments that would fit their
purposes.
An important part of the explanation is the influence of the rise of a new
commercial society during the nineteenth century. The development of a
national market, new patterns of economic activity, changing modes of
production and marketing, and new industries created new interests, which, in
turn, left a deep imprint on the framework of copyright. A strong array of
economic interests that grew stronger throughout the nineteenth century
exerted a constant force against the broad originality doctrine.
Historically, copyright could extend, in principle, to any text printed by a
publisher. The majority of materials registered during the first decades of the
American copyright regime were far from embodying the romantic ideal of
originality. Consistent with traditional practices and with a strand of thought
that viewed copyright as a tool for promoting "learning" or the "sciences and
the useful arts," copyright was widely used to protect materials such as
textbooks, dictionaries, and a host of other "useful" or didactic works.2
Throughout the nineteenth century, the largest relative share of the publishing
market continued to be occupied by such works.8 This created an entrenched
82. See Joseph J. Felcone, New Jersey Copyright Registrations 1791-1845, 104 PROC. AM.
ANTIQUARIAN SOC'Y 51 (1995); James Gilreath, American Literature, Public Policy and the
Copyright Laws Before 18oo, in FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 179o-18oo, at xv, xv Games
Gilreath ed., 1987); Meredith L. McGill, Copyright in the Early Republic, in 2 A HISTORY OF
THE BOOK IN AMERICA (Robert A. Gross & Marry Kelly eds., forthcoming 2009).
83. WILLIAM CHARVAT, The Condition of Authorship in 182o, in THE PROFESSION OF AUTHORSHIP
IN AMERICA, 18OO-1870: THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM CHARVAT 29, 34-35 (Matthew J. Bruccoli
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interest group that relied on copyright protection extending well beyond the
terrain that could be covered by any regime based on a substantial criterion of
originality commensurate with the abstract ideology of authorship.
The economic changes of the nineteenth century-first in the book
publishing industry and then beyond it-further consolidated the interests
against heavy originality restrictions. Beginning in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, the publishing industry underwent fundamental changes,
advancing dramatically during the century. 84 For the first time, conditions
appeared for the emergence of a national mass market for books: broad
demand, mass production capabilities, relatively cheap book commodities, and
national patterns of production and marketing."s In the decades leading up to
the Civil War, the organization of the industry was radically transformed. The
traditional artisan-based printing craft was gradually replaced by a capitalist
ed., 1968) [hereinafter CHARVAT PAPERS]. It is estimated that, in i86o, textbooks constituted
thirty to forty percent of the books published in the United States. In later times, this
relative share increased. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 222.
84. HELLMUT LEHMANN-HAUPT, THE BOOK IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE MAKING, THE
SELLING, AND THE COLLECTING OF BOOKS IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (1939). In the 183os,
one hundred books on average were published each year in the United States. In 1859, the
figure rose to 1350. In 182o, the value of books manufactured and sold in the United States
was $2.5 million. In 1856, this value was $16 million. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 221.
Underlying this expansion were technological, economic, and social developments.
Some of the most important developments were advances in printing and book-making
technology such as the flatbed iron press and, later, the steam and electricity-powered
cylinder presses; the transportation revolution, which first arose in the form of canals and
later railroads; and the increased rates of literacy. For the role of technological
developments, see LEHMANN-HAUPT, supra, at 71-83; JUDITH A. McGAw, MOST WONDERFUL
MACHINE: MECHANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BERKSHIRE PAPER MAKING, 1801-1885
(1987); 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 257-62; and RONALD J. ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE:
ANTEBELLUM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE AMERICAN READING PUBLIC 5-11 (1993)
[hereinafter ZBORAY, A FICTIvE PEOPLE]. For history of the transportation revolution, see
GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION 1815-186o (The Economic
History of the United States vol. 4, 1951); 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 204, 207; ZBORAY, A
FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra, at 12-14, 55-68; and Ronald J. Zboray, The Transportation Revolution
and Antebellum Book Distribution Reconsidered, 38 AM. Q. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Zboray,
Transportation Revolution]. For history of the rise of literacy rates, see WILLIAM J. GILMORE,
READING BECOMES A NECESSITY OF LIFE: MATERIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE IN RURAL NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1989); LEE SOLTOW & EDWARD STEVENS, THE RISE OF LITERACY AND
THE COMMON SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO 1870 (1981);
and 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 207.
85. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 206-07; James Gilreath, American Book Distribution, 95 PROC. AM.
ANTIQUARIAN SOC'Y 501 (1986). For a somewhat critical assessment of the common claim
that the price of books significantly reduced, see ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at
11-12.
118:186 20o8
THE IDEOLOGY OF AUTHORSHIP REVISITED
commodity industry.86 The older pattern in which the roles of the printer, the
book seller, and the publisher were often blurred was replaced by a new one
that included a stricter differentiation of these roles 87 and in which the
publisher was dominant.
The outcome of all these changes was a new, extremely competitive, and
commercialized publishing industry.88 One scholar described it as follows:
The publishing world in America, emerging from the provincial stage,
was in the midst of a mechanical and economic revolution, which,
despite the small notice given to it in orthodox histories, had a
profound influence on the development of American literature. Like
most periods of rapid and chaotic expansion, it was characterized by
greed, ruthlessness, and small heed to the fundamental decencies of
civilized business relations. 89
The industry came to be characterized by an increasingly self-conscious
commercial drive90 and increasingly sophisticated strategies for creating and
capturing market demand.
Many of these market strategies had little to do with copyright protection.
Indeed, some of them, such as the extremely lucrative practice of reprinting
popular British works, relied on the absence of copyright. 9' Other strategies for
creating and exploiting market demand, however, relied in part on the
86. Id. at 4. Accompanying the publishers' celebratory image of this shift were also the protests
and complaints of its victims: journeymen and other artisans who were reduced to the level
of wage laborers. On the metamorphosis of the printing craft into a publishing industry, see
id. at 6-9.
87. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 212-13.
88. Id. at 207; ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 17-18.
89. LUKE WHITE, JR., HENRY WILLIAM HERBERT AND THE AMERICAN PUBLISHING SCENE 1831-
1858, at 7-8 (1943).
go. See WILLIAM CHARVAT, The Beginnings of Professionalism, in CHARVAT PAPERS, supra note 83,
at 5, 18-28. This is not to say, of course, that earlier publishers or authors had no profit
motive. The point is that the industry was reshaped in a way that stimulated new patterns
and strategies of market behavior, and a new self-consciousness grew in this respect.
91. International copyright protection was a recurring issue of fierce debate in the United States
during the nineteenth century. Despite continuous lobbying and criticism, both foreign and
domestic, it was only by 1891 that the tide had changed, and the United States began to
recognize copyright in foreign works through the Chace International Copyright Act. Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 11o6. In 1853, there were 733 works published in the United
States. Two hundred seventy-eight of them were reprints of British works and thirty-five
were translations of other foreign works. See ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 3.
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exclusivity promised by copyright protection. 92 Many of the significant new
products aimed at new markets could not clear any substantial originality bar
that would have even come close to the romantic ideal.
As for the merit or creativity aspect of originality, in addition to the still-
important traditional publications such as textbooks or dictionaries, there was
an influx of new materials and formats whose ability to meet such criteria was
questionable. 93 Magazines and journals of various kinds,94 the "dime novel,"9"
the "penny paper," 96 and the highly popular illustration books, 97 were all
aimed to appeal to a mass audience at attractive prices. As one of the first
advertisements for commodity literature of this sort read: "BOOKS FOR THE
MILLION! A DOLLAR BOOK FOR A DIME! ! 128 pages complete, only Ten
Cents! ! !,,9s These new cheap formats often received scorn and criticism from
contemporaries who lamented the deficiencies and even the supposed
pernicious effect of "cheap" literature. 99 But they tapped and created an
unprecedented mass market, and they constituted a very lucrative opportunity
for publishers.
The same principle applied to the novelty aspect of originality. Numerous
new products and formats, the result of new marketing techniques, were the
antithesis of the radical novelty notion.' 0 Revised editions, serializations of
existing works, and collected works volumes' were embodiments of existing
92. Other characteristics of nineteenth-century copyright, such as stringent registration,
deposit, and notice requirements, as well as the cost of enforcement, often made reliance on
copyright unattractive in the context of cheap publication formats. See Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 502-28 (2004) (discussing the
"filtering" function of nineteenth-century copyright). Nevertheless, it seems that at least in
some of the strategies involved, publishers did try to rely on copyright protection.
93. See generally PUBLISHERS FOR MASS ENTERTAINMENT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
(Madeleine B. Stern ed., 198o) (surveying various nineteenth-century publishers of popular
and entertainment publications).
94. ISABELLE LEHUU, CARNIVAL ON THE PAGE: POPULAR PRINT MEDIA IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
59-75 (2000); ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 32-34.
95. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 248-51; ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 31-32.
96. LEHUU, supra note 94, at 36-58.
97. Id. at 76-101; 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 252-54.
98. Advertisement, N.Y. TRm3., June 7, 186o, at i.
99. LEHUU, supra note 94, at 126-55.
ioo. Henry Longfellow and his publishers were the pioneers of many of these new marketing
techniques, including sophisticated price-discrimination strategies. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27,
at 211-12; WILLIAM CHARVAT, Lonffellow's Income from His Writings, 184o-1852, in CHARVAT
PAPERS, supra note 83, at 155, 162-63.
lol. LEHUU, supra note 94, at 72-73; 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 219, 240-51.
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works with slight changes. To the extent that commercial actors wanted to rely
on copyright protection in the context of such products, a substantial
originality standard was out of the question.
In the later part of the century, economic developments expanded the
constituency with a firm interest against a substantial originality threshold.
Various industries outside, of the traditional realm of the book trade began to
discover copyright and attempted to use it strategically in order to achieve
market advantages. Some of these fields later became part of what would be
called the "content industries," whose products are considered to be part of the
core of copyright protection." 2 Photography that appeared in the late
nineteenth century is illustrative. In photography's early days many considered
it a mechanical process or a technical craft that involved little creativity or
originality in the romantic sense.1"3 Other fields, in which actors discovered
and tried to use copyright, had a more tangential relation to either the
traditional -book-trade or to the emerging content industries. The rising giant
of advertisement, 1 4 makers of sale catalogs,' and users of labels on
commodities '°6 all tried, with varying degrees of success, to draft copyright
into their service. Many of those new materials for which copyright protection
was sought-both those that were later admitted to the core of creativity and
those that remained at the fringe-were seen as lacking originality. In a
copyright regime based on a substantial originality criterion, protection could
not have been extended to such fields. This created another consistent set of
interests that continuously applied pressure against a demanding originality
doctrine.
The economic interests account is an important part of explaining the
formation of originality during the nineteenth century. Yet it is inadequate as a
sole explanation for three reasons. First, the interest group explanation alone
seems indeterminate. It shows that there existed substantial and consistent
102. See generally PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 233-384 (2004) (describing the appearance of the modern content
industries around the turn of the twentieth century).
103. For the changing social conceptualization of photography and its relationship with
copyright, see Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PiTr. L. REV. 385, 395-415 (2004).
104. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Mut. Adver. Co. v. Refo, 76
F. 961 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896); Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Lawrence v.
Cupples, 15 F. Cas. 25 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 8135).
105. J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316 (7th Cir. 1897); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999
(Thompson, CircuitJustice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
1o6. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428,431 (1891); Scoville v. Toland, 21 F. Cas. 863 (C.C.D. Ohio
1848) (No. 12,553).
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economic interests that favored a minimal originality requirement, but it does
not show why these overcame countervailing interests. There were other
significant actors who were just as interested in limiting the scope of copyright
protection through a robust originality threshold. For most of the nineteenth
century, there was a prospering and entrenched reprint industry in the United
States" 7 whose members appear to have been as organized, sophisticated, and
informed as any other actor in the field. Yet the originality standard was a very
low one from the moment it appeared and was further eroded during the
century. ' Second, the economic interests account provides no explanation for
the ongoing clinging to originality, its rising rhetorical significance in
copyright law, and its intricate paradoxical structure. If it was just the balance
of power that doomed originality as a substantial limitation on
copyrightability, why was it not simply rejected altogether at its first
appearance or completely purged from copyright law in a later stage? Third,
regardless of whether the economic interest explanation could be sufficient in
and of itself, when one looks at the relevant texts it becomes clear that there
were also other noneconomic forces at work.
One important factor that joined economic trends in shaping originality
was a changing understanding of the legitimate role of government and of the
proper procedures and institutions for carrying out that role. Historians
described the dominant understanding of proper government during the late
colonial era and in the first quarter of the nineteenth century as the
"commonwealth" style of government.' °9 Under this framework, government
107. MEREDITH L. MCGILL, AMERICAN LITERATURE AND THE CULTURE OF REPRINTING, 1834-1853,
at 3-4 (2003).
lo8. Therefore, the common account of a collective action problem that consistently skews the
politics of intellectual property in favor of protectionist trends does not seem to be
conclusively applicable. For public choice and collective action failures as an explanation of
the development of intellectual property law, see Fisher, supra note 43, at 277-80; Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857,
1875 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Propery Law,
1900-2ooo, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187 (2000); and Yochai Benkler, The Battle over the Institutional
Ecosystem in the Digital Environment, COMM. OF THE ACM, Feb. 2001, at 84, 89.
log. See CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS,
18oo-1890 (1960); OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (rev.
ed. 1969); Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA,
1776-186o (1948). For a general survey, see Robert A. Lively, The American System: A Review
Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REV., Mar. 1955, at 81, which is critical of the alleged commonwealth-
scholarship tendency to neglect the empirical examination of actual governmental practices
and their effects; and Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the Economy: Studies of the
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enjoyed broad legitimacy for intervening in all aspects of economic and social
life in order to promote the public good. " Additionally, commonwealth-style
American government was characterized by particular institutional forms. The
ideal of active promotion of the public good was put into practice through a
variety of methods. Many of those were general regulations of various sorts."'
More unique, however, was an eclectic group of techniques of ad hoc
governmental involvement in economic life, such as bounties, special
privileges, land grants, franchise, and special incorporation grants."2
Underlying this extensive system of ad hoc privileges were several interlocking
principles. First, these measures were particularistic rather than universal. The
government would choose a specific private party on which to confer special
powers or benefits that were not granted to others, even if they were similarly
situated. Second, these privileges and the process of their creation were overtly
political. Each grant and its specific terms were directly debated and authorized
on a discretionary basis by the political representatives of the people, usually
the legislature. The role of the political representative was to assess the benefit
offered to the public by a particular private party and to allocate an adequate
reward or encouragement. Third, these practices were based on a strong
paternalistic assumption that the members of government know best how to
promote the public welfare and which private party could best serve that goal.
Fourth, this entire framework was based on a conception of the public good as
an identifiable cohesive set of interests common to all members of society. " 3
Beginning in the 183os, the commonwealth style of government and the
ideological outlook in which it was grounded declined. It was gradually
replaced by the new ideology of the liberal state.1 14 In the antebellum liberal
"Commonwealth" Policy in Nineteenth-Century America, 3 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 135 (1972)
(reviewing HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra).
11o. WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURYAMERICA 84-105 (1996); Scheiber, supra note lo9, at 135-36. Indeed, the very term
"economy" had a meaning different than the modern one. As William Novak explained, by
the late eighteenth century the word roughly meant "any society ordered after the manner of
a family or, similarly, the general administration of the concerns of a community with a view
to orderly conduct and productiveness." NOVAK, supra, at 87.
1. HANDLIN &HANDLIN, supra note log, at 61-64; NovAK, supra note iio, at 3.
112. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note lo9, at 51-86; Harry N. Scheiber, Government and the
American Economy: Three Stages of Historical Change, 1790-1941, in ESSAYS FROM THE LOWELL
CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL HISTORY 1980 AND 1981, at 128-34 (Robert Weible, Oliver Ford
& Paul Marion eds., 1981).
113. See HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note lo9, at 51-52; Scheiber, supra note lo9, at 136.
114. The Handlins called this new model "a humanitarian police state." HANDLIN & HANDLIN,
supra note lo9, at 203.
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state, extensive governmental regulation of the economy still enjoyed broad
legitimacy."' The commonwealth institutional forms, however, lost favor and
were ultimately abandoned. Confidence in the existence of a cohesive set of
interests common to all members of society-and in the ability of government
to reflect it-waned."' A distinction gradually appeared between a public
sphere and a private sphere in which government could not legitimately
intervene. 117 Special privileges of various kinds became common targets of
venomous attacks. These were increasingly considered the manifestation of
corruption and of the hijacking of the republic by an aristocratic oligarchy.
While government still enjoyed broad legitimacy to regulate in the name of
public welfare, it was expected to do so through universal regulatory regimes
that created general rights rather than ad hoc privileges. These were justified
on the basis of the general utility of the regime rather than governmental
evaluation of the merit of any specific case." 8
The traces of this shift in the concept and practice of proper government
can be found in copyright law. The colonial and state ad hoc copyright
grants," 9 in which special privileges were granted to individual publishers or
authors, were deeply embedded in the commonwealth special privileges
tradition. The state copyright statutes of the 1780s 1 ° were a first step toward a
universal regime of rights. The launch of the federal general copyright regime
completed this shift on the primary level.1 ' On a secondary level, however, the
struggle between the two ideologies and institutional forms continued within
copyright law during the nineteenth century.
115. Id. at 213-44; Scheiber, supra note 112, at 136.
116. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note lo9, at 170-189; LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE
POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN
ERA 133-44 (1989); Scheiber, supra note lo9, at 136.
117. HARTZ, supra note lo9, at 79-81; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1982).
118. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); KOHL, supra note 116, at 215; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 23-26, 306-21, 334-39 (1945); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND
POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 34-35 (199o); William Weston Fisher III,
The Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of American Property Doctrine, 1776-188o, at
370 (Sept. 1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with
author).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
121. For an explanation of the early date of this shift from specific privileges to universal rights in
the context of copyright and patents, in contrast to other fields, such as corporate charters,
see Bracha, supra note 27, at 553-73.
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Originality doctrine was the main doctrinal area in which this struggle took
place and in which the liberal state framework displaced remnants of
commonwealth thinking only gradually. The implication of a demanding
originality standard as a prerequisite for copyright protection was entrusting
judges or juries with a diluted version of the role played by the legislature in
the commonwealth system. In order to apply such an originality requirement,
courts would have had to assess the substantive merit of a specific copyrighted
work and make an ad hoc determination whether the public interest justified
granting a reward in the form of exclusive rights. In the early cases in which a
relatively stringent originality standard was applied, judges did just that.122
When Justice Thompson, for example, ruled in Clayton v. Stone that a price
catalog was a work of "mere industry, unconnected with learning and the
sciences, ' .23 he was making a substantive assessment of the work before him
which resulted in a decision to deny public protection.
The legitimacy of this approach, however, was in constant decline as the
liberal state framework replaced the commonwealth. In 1825, one writer
supplied an eloquent attack on the traditional privilege system in the context of
intellectual works:
In a free country where there exist no privileged orders, nor unequally
protected institutions, it will generally happen that the value of every
branch of human knowledge, as far as concerns such a community,
will be very nearly indicated by the quantity of intellectual capital, to
use the language of political economists, naturally determined to its
cultivation." 4
He concluded that "we consider the inference of all force whatever, in
determining the channels through which physical or intellectual industry shall
flow, as impertinent and oppressive.' '25 This new aversion to special privileges
and the rise of universal rights regimes informed the rising line of cases that
refused to recognize a substantial originality requirement. The ideal became a
general system, free from ad hoc judgments of substantive merit in which, as
122. See supra text accompanying notes 56-71.
123. 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (Thompson, Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
124. ATLANTIC MAG., Feb. 1, 1825, at 272, 273 [hereinafter Atlantic Mag. Essay].
125. Id. at 28o.
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Justice Story put it in one of his originality decisions, any person would be
"entitled to his copy-right, 'valere quantum valere potest. ' .126
A second and related intellectual development that influenced copyright's
understanding of originality was the appearance of a market conception of
value characteristic of the new commercial market society. 27 Late in the
eighteenth century it was common to see resources (the paradigmatic example
was land) as having intrinsic value derived from their objective qualities and
not dependent upon subjective human desires. Even in 1853 Francis Wayland
distinguished in his political economy treatise between "intrinsic value" and
"exchangeable value," insisting that market prices and the "intrinsic value" of a
thing were two fundamentally different things. 2 9 This notion was intertwined
with a general willingness to measure the fairness of transactions13' against a
standard of exchange of equal values. 3 ' As market culture suffused all aspects
of life, such tendencies were eroded and eventually disappeared. They were
replaced by an understanding of value as synonymous with market demand
and by a normative reluctance to challenge the outcomes or the prices produced
by market exchanges.' 32 As one writer on political economy put it, value "is not
126. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 621 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436);
see supra note 53.
127. The literature about the rise of the market is vast. For general surveys, see Allan Kulikoff,
The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America, 46 WM. & MARY Q 120, 122-26 (1989);
Michael Merrill, Putting Capitalism in Its Place: A Review of Recent Literature, 52 WM. & MARY
Q 315 (1995); and Gordon S. Wood, The Enemy Is Us: Democratic Capitalism in the Early
Republic, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 293, 293-98 (1996).
128. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., From the Fetishism of Commodities to the Regulated Market: The
Rise and Decline of Property, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 79, 86-91 (1987).
129. FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 15-24 (1853).
130. The most detailed exploration of this outlook in early American law is Morton Horwitz's
analysis of contract law and the equitable conception of contracts. See MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 161 (1977). For a skeptical analysis
of Horwitz's argument in the context of contract law, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1979). For a survey of the debate,
see Robert W. Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict of Narratives, 37 TULSA L.
REV. 915, 918-19 (2002).
131. Thus, Benjamin Franklin could speak of "fair commerce" as the exchange of "equal values."
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Positions To Be Examined, Concerning National Wealth (Apr. 4, 1769), in
4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 235, 236 (John Bigelow ed., New York,
Putnam 1887).
132. Armstrong, supra note 128, at 91-96; Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 16oo-1836:
How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 177, 230-39 (2004).
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an inherent and invariable attribute, but is the relative power which one thing
has of purchasing other things." 13
Publishers and writers, who operated within the new commercialized
market for books, exhibited similar tendencies. Books and other works were
increasingly seen and spoken of as commodities whose values were
synonymous with market demand. 134 In 1835 Washington Irving, one of the
first American authors whose works utilized the new marketing techniques,
wrote to John Pendleton Kennedy:
[I] think honest Horse shoe will be a decided favorite with the
public.... I was so tickled with some parts of it that I could not for
the life of me help reading them to some of my cronies among the
brokers and jobbers of Wall Street .... They think your work could
not be "thrown into the market" at a better moment than the present,
when money is plenty and "Fancy Stocks" of all kinds are "looking
up."' 35
The rise of the new concept of market value was closely related to the
demise of commonwealth-style government and the growth of the liberal state.
The decline of the legitimacy of ad hoc evaluations of public value by
government necessitated an alternative mechanism for assessing value and
allocating reward. The market and its determinations of market values filled
this gap. An 1825 essay in Atlantic Magazine, quoted earlier, made this
connection between the liberal state and the market conception of value explicit
in regard to intellectual works. The disdain for "privileged orders [and]
institutions"'' 6 professed by the writer was accompanied by the following
vision: "The supply of literature and science will be in proportion to their
demand and their demand in proportion to their usefulness. The elements of
133. ARTHUR LATHAM, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (7th ed. 1872); see also WILLARD
PHILLIPS, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH REFERENCE TO THE INSTITUTIONS,
RESOURCES, AND CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES 29 (1828) (observing that a thing "can
hardly be said to have an intrinsic value, since its value depends upon the desire of others to
obtain it from the possessor by giving something in exchange").
134. Books as commodities, in the context of the new publishing industry, were one of the most
striking examples of the dependence of value on market whims. See ZBo,AY, A FICTIVE
PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 17.
135. Letter from Washington Irving to John Pendleton Kennedy (June 5, 1835), in 2
WASHINGTON IRVING LETTERS 829 (Ralph M. Aderman, Herbert L. Kleinfeld & Jennifer S.
Banks eds., 1979). Irving was referring to the novel JOHN PENDLETON KENNEDY, HORSE
SHOE ROBINSON: A TALE OF THE TORY ASCENDANCY (1835).
136. Atlantic Mag. Essay, supra note 124, at 273.
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really valuable information, the principles of serviceable, practical and necessary
knowledge, will receive the largest share of cultivation, because they will be
most in request."'37
The decline of an inherent conception of value, its replacement by a market
understanding, and the strong drive to assign all judgments of value to the
market informed the resistance to a stringent originality requirement in
copyright law. The line of cases in which judges showed willingness to engage
in substantive originality inquiries and to assess the worthiness of works was
rooted in the older pre-market outlook. Thus, in a late remnant of this view, a
1903 court explained in regard to a play that it found to be devoid of merit that
"[s]ociety may tolerate, and even patronize, such exhibitions, but Congress has
no constitutional authority to enact a law that will copyright them, and the
courts will degrade themselves when they recognize them as entitled to the
protection of the law.' '1, 8 Market demand and value were two different things
from this perspective.
In contrast, the opposite line of cases, which eventually took over, rejected
such judgments of inherent value. Thus, when he dismissed the originality
challenge in Emerson v. Davies, Justice Story wrote that whether the author's
work was "better or worse is not a material inquiry in this case," since "[i]f
worse, his work will not be used by the community at large; if better, it is very
likely to be so used." 39 In the crucial conclusion, he found that a work "may be
more useful or less useful," but the only significance of that is to "diminish or
increase the relative values of. .. works in the market.' 14
°
The drive to equate value with market demand and to see the market as the
only legitimate way of allocating reward became the norm as the century
progressed. One court phrased the new dominant view in 1894 when it claimed
that the "box-office value" test was the only conceivable one.' 4' It explained,
"[W] ith reference to matters like this at bar, touching which there are no rules
except in the unmeasured characteristics of humanity, their reception by the
public may be the only test on the question of insignificance or worthlessness
under the copyright statutes.' 42 Originality, in the romantic sense, had no
place in a worldview such as this.
137. Id. at 274.
138. Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1903).
139. 8 F. Cas. 615, 621 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
140. Id. at 620.
141. Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 763 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
142. Id. at 764.
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A third ideological factor that influenced originality doctrine was the
changing understanding of the judicial role. During the first half of the
century, the dominant perception of law and the common mode of legal
reasoning tended to be instrumentalist. Law was typically seen as a tool for
advancing social goals and public welfare. Accordingly, legal questions were
often argued in terms of their social consequences, and legal outcomes were
justified by an appeal to underlying social policies and interests. 143 The ideal
judge was seen as interpreting and shaping the law so as to promote social
welfare, common interest, and substantive equity. 144
The instrumentalism of the antebellum period declined after the war and
was replaced by a very different set of attitudes. By the last decades of the
century, these attitudes crystallized into an ethos of the legal field and of the
judicial role that later came to be known as "legal formalism" or as "classical
legal thought.' 14' The former consequentialist modes of legal reasoning were
replaced by increasingly formal ones based on abstraction, logical
argumentation, and strict categorization. The ideal image of the judge as a
prudent promoter of beneficial social policies was replaced by a different
model. In this new model, the jurist was seen as the agent of an apolitical and
neutral discipline. He was seen as a proficient professional who mastered a set
of technical skills and based his decisions on the accurate employment of such
skills.146
143. On the rise of social instrumentalism in nineteenth-century American law, see generally
HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 1-3o; JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); and William E. Nelson,
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Centuy
America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974). For a much more skeptical view about the claim that
the mid-nineteenth-century mode of judicial reasoning was overwhelmingly instrumentalist
and that after the Civil War it was supplanted by a formalist higher law approach, see Harry
N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of
Judicial Reasoning" in the 19 th Century, 1975 WIs. L. REv. 1.
144. See Fisher, supra note 118, at lO9-11o. For a somewhat different account of the period's "legal
consciousness" described as "pre-classical legal thought," see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE
AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006).
145. HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 253-66; KENNEDY, supra note 144; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERiCA, 1886-1937
(1998).
146. HORWTZ, supra note 130, at 9-19; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv.
1 (1983). The question of the extent to which late nineteenth-century American jurists were
"formalists" in the strong sense -that is, the extent to which they believed in and advocated
a theory of law as a "gapless" system of norms capable of producing one right answer in any
case on the basis of strict logical deduction procedures- is a matter of some controversy. See
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 105 (1997) (arguing that this
understanding of formalism as a gapless system was invented by later critics of late
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The rise of a formalist conception of legal reasoning and of a dominant
image of the judicial role as based on technical skill amplified the other two
trends discussed above. In the new legal climate, judges no longer presented
themselves as confident members of the elite making substantive judgments
and allocating privileges in the name of the public good. They tended to turn
instead to the alternative self-image of masters of a neutral, logic-based system
of rules and a method of reasoning. In an ideological environment in which the
notion of inherent objective value lost all coherence, it was natural for judges to
present their role as restricted to the neutral operation of a general set of rules
and principles while leaving all substantive judgments of value to the market. 147
In copyright law, this meant that judges recoiled from the notion of
substantive originality that would have required them to make regularly and
overtly exactly the sort of substantive judgments they were claiming to
abdicate. ,8 The court that in the 1894 case Henderson v. Tompkins claimed that
"box-office value" was the only value applicable to copyrighted works149 also
wove into this argument a view of the proper role of judges and juries and the
sort of determinations they were qualified to make. "[N] either courts nor juries
have any certain rule for valuing it," the court explained, "except such as comes
from evidence of the effect which the composition in question has on masses of
men."' 0 Similarly, by the time of Bleistein, Justice Holmes' found it necessary
nineteenth-century legal thought); David Rabban, Law's History: Late Nineteenth-Century
American Legal Scholarship and the Transatlantic Turn to History (Sept. 18, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (criticizing the assumption that dominant
late nineteenth-century American jurists believed in a gapless legal system based on logical
deduction); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists (St. John's Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0130, 20o8), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123498 (arguing that the conventional wisdom that late
nineteenth-century American jurists were formalists and believed in deductive legal
reasoning is false and was invented by later critics). The question of formalism in this strong
sense aside, there is less controversy regarding the more modest contention that late
nineteenth-century legal thought and reasoning in America were typically less openly
instrumentalist and more formal than in the first half of the century.
147. For an argument that the rise of formalism was related to the legal profession's interests and
self-image, see HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 258. Horwitz further claims that the rise of
formalism was also related to the interest of mercantile and entrepreneurial groups in
freezing a reallocation of wealth and power achieved through legal changes in the early
nineteenth century. Id. at 259. My argument here is agnostic to this further claim.
148. Of course, the choice of the level and character of copyright's originality standard was itself
a substantive policy choice with important social implications. It was, however, much easier
to repress and ignore this fact, especially in comparison to overt judgments of substantive
originality by judges.
149. 60 F. 758, 763 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
150. Id.
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to explain that "[i] t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."' 2
At this point it becomes necessary to ask: why did originality survive at all
in copyright law? If there was a solid and continuous array of economic
interests set against it and a powerful combination of ideological forces pulling
away from it, why was it not completely eradicated? Moreover, what accounts
for the considerable rise in the rhetorical importance of originality in doctrinal
copyright discourse during the late nineteenth century?
Original authorship had been the fundamental justification and the
underlying myth of copyright in America since the late eighteenth century. It
informed and supported both natural rights and utilitarian strands of copyright
thought. Directly denying altogether the existence of an originality
requirement or purging it from legal doctrine would have created a serious
dissonance between practical legal discourse and the basic mythology of the
field. It would have also created a dissonance between conflicting strong
ideological commitments of the relevant actors.
One can imagine an alternative history in which the growing pressures on
originality and the widening rift between doctrine and theory would have
eventually led to a Kuhnian revolution. 5 3 In this hypothetical universe, the
original authorship paradigm would collapse and be replaced by an alternative
supporting myth or justification. The actual development of copyright in the
United States, however, followed a different pattern. Instead of a paradigmatic
shift, the system was gradually reshaped from the inside. It accommodated the
pressures against originality without abandoning it altogether. One aspect of
this process was the dilution of the theoretical image of originality as it was
embedded in doctrine. As concepts taken from the abstract ideology of
authorship were converted to actual legal doctrine, they were reshaped under
the influence of external forces. At the same time, there appeared mechanisms
for reducing and softening the dissonance between the prevailing ideology of
the field and its actual institutional details.
The rise of the rhetoric of originality and the late nineteenth-century
elevation of originality to an unprecedented status were such mechanisms for
reducing the dissonance caused by the growing gap between doctrine and
151. Justice Holmes was no great subscriber to legal formalism. He strongly believed, however,
in objective legal standards and objected to any trace of subjective moralism in the law. See
HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 236-37.
152. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
153. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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fundamental myth. They helped to maintain a thin crust of coherence that
covered the obvious inconsistencies between the two. This was also the source
of the strange inverse correlation between the increasing rhetorical importance
of originality and its shrinking significance as a doctrinal requirement. The
wider the gap between doctrine and myth grew, the more acute was the
dissonance and the stronger became the mechanisms for its suppression. Thus,
paradoxically, instead of bringing about the collapse of original authorship
ideology, the social and doctrinal developments of the nineteenth century
ultimately perpetuated it. By the end of the century, the ideology was
embedded and reproduced in internal legal principles and it was awarded the
status of a defining feature and a constitutional norm. The intricate doctrinal
structure of originality, however, reflected the conflicting forces that shaped it.
It contained arguments and concepts taken right out of the lexicon of romantic
authorship alongside others that embodied its antithesis. It elevated originality
to the status of a fundamental tenet of the field, while simultaneously
emasculating it.
IV. OBJECTS OF PROPERTY: THE WORK
While originality doctrine embodied copyright's complex relationship with
the image of the author as a creator ex nihilo, other doctrinal developments
played a similar role in respect to his representation as a property owner.
Within the late eighteenth-century conception of authorship, authors were
envisioned as having property rights in their intellectual creations. Copyright
was thus reimagined as ownership - that is to say, total control - over an
intangible object of property. For a long period, however, copyright doctrine
was completely oblivious to this notion and remained confined to the limited
traditional economic entitlement to print a text. During the second half of the
nineteenth century, this aspect of copyright underwent a fundamental
doctrinal and conceptual change. The scope of copyright protection expanded,
new entitlements were created, and a novel concept of copyright as ownership
of intellectual works appeared.
Again, one emblematic case is usually remembered today of the early
American approach to the character of copyright protection. In the 1854 case
Stowe v. Thomas,'s4 Justice Grier rejected an infringement suit against a German
154. 23 F. Cas. 201 (Grier, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514); see also Melissa J.
Homestead, "When I Can Read My Title Clear": Harriet Beecher Stowe and the Stowe v.
Thomas Copyright Infringement Case, 27 PROSPECTS 201 (2002) (describing the case and its
implications).
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translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin. In his opinion he explained that the author's
"exclusive property... cannot be vested in the author as abstractions, but only
in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in which he
has clothed them."'' s The "only property" which the author has, Grier wrote,
"is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of
characters .... This is what the law terms copy, or copyright.'
' 6
Grier's reasoning in Stowe was not a mere curious view. Rather, it was well
grounded in the common sense understanding of copyright that dominated
American law for the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1854, however, the
decision was behind the times. The view of copyright it represented was in
decline. It was bitterly attacked by commentators,' and its outcome was
overturned sixteen years later when Congress amended the Copyright Act
explicitly to prohibit unauthorized translations of copyrighted works. ls The
decline of Stowe was a part of a broader transformation of the concept of
copyright's character and scope of protection. I first describe this process and
its relationship with authorship ideology on the level of copyright doctrine and
then locate it within its broader social context.
A. The Rise of the Work
Pressures to expand the scope of copyright protection began to appear early
on. Jedidiah Morse, in one of the earliest petitions for individual enactments
received by Congress prior to passing the 1790 Copyright Act, complained, "it
was an easy matter, by a few alterations & Additions, to destroy the identity of
the Books & of the maps."'' 9 He therefore asked Congress to "secure him the
exclusive benefit that may arise from said book & maps" and that the statute or
law "might be so expressed as effectually to secure [him] against all
mutilations, alterations & abridgments ... as may operate to his injury."' 6 ' At
this point, however, the traditional framework of copyright firmly resisted
155. 23 F. Cas. at 206.
156. Id. at 206-07.
157. Anticipating Stowe's holding, George Ticknor Curtis had launched, in his important 1847
copyright treatise, a fierce assault on the English precedents that exempted translations.
CURTIS, supra note 55, at 293. Eaton Drone included in his 1879 treatise a whole subsection
entitled "Stowe v. Thomas Criticised." DRONE, supra note 71, at 454-55.
158. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
159. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 511 (Charlene Bangs Brickford & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1986).
160. Id.
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such expansion. A slew of English precedents established that the only form of
copyright infringement was printing copies of a protected text. Accordingly,
various forms of what would become known as derivative works, such as
translations, abridgments, and adaptations, were considered independent,
non-infringing works.,6 ,
Two principles dominated this early framework of copyright as the right of
"printing copies." First, questions of infringement were framed in terms of
exact identity. As Lord Chancellor Hardwicke put it in Gyles v. Wilcox, the
question was "[w]hether this book ... which the defendant has published, is
the same with Sir Matthew Hale's Histor. Placit. Coronce, the copy of which is
now the property of the plaintiff. ' ' , 62 Second, a subsequent altered work was
seen as a copy only as long as such alterations could be considered "colourable"
changes introduced only in order to evade the prohibition on making copies. In
the words of Lord Ellenborough in the 1802 case Cary v. Kearsley, the question
was always "whether the publication.., was to convey to the public the notes
and observations fairly, or only to colour the publication of the original essay,
and make that a pretext for pirating it. 1
63
When nineteenth-century pressures to expand copyright protection
intensified, the ideology of authorship supplied an important source of
concepts for translating copyright interests into legal arguments. Two main
authorship-based strategies were repeatedly employed to bring down the old
structure of copyright. The first built on the notion that copyright was
ownership of an intellectual object created by the author rather than an
economic privilege to print. An elaborate representation of the author's
intellectual creation as an intellectual essence that could take a manifold of
concrete forms gradually developed. Copyright, in turn, was presented as a
general control of this elusive intellectual essence, irrespective of form.
Second, drawing on the theme of originality, there appeared a categorical
hierarchy between original works and derivative works. Traditional copyright
thinking treated many such derivatives as meritorious works in their own
right. In the new hierarchy, however, some works were presented as inherently
i6f. Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1019-20 (Ch.); Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng.
Rep. 489, 490 (Ch.); Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 17o Eng. Rep. 679, 68o (K.B.); Sayre v.
Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep 139, 140 (K.B.). For an early American case following the same
principles in defining infringement, see Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 765 (Thompson,
Circuit Justice, C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 158o).
162. 26 Eng. Rep. at 490.
163. 170 Eng. Rep. at 680; see RlCHARD GODSON, A PRACTIcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 477 (2d ed. 1844).
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superior due to their supposed originality, while others were relegated to the
now, by definition, inferior status of derivatives.
The two original-authorship-based strategies were mediated through a
growing tendency to identify the object of copyright protection with the
market value of the intellectual work. These three ideas permeated George
Ticknor Curtis's 1847 landmark treatise. Curtis defined the scope of copyright
protection as follows: "[W]hile the public enjoys the right of reading the
intellectual contents of a book, to the author belongs the exclusive right to take
all the profits of publication which the book can, in any form, produce."
64
This shift to protecting profits undermined the previous breathing space
allotted for subsequent uses. The public policy, which admits "some use of all
antecedent literature," Curtis wrote, "will not sanction direct and palpable
injuries to the author, in whom the law has vested the sole right to take the
profits of his own book and every part of it."'' 6 The "most material inquiry" in
each case came to be "whether the author has sustained or is likely to sustain
any injury by the publication of which he complains." 66 He concluded,
It is easy to imagine cases, where the use which a subsequent writer
makes of a previous publication is apparently within the limits of the
general right of selection, or citation or tacit adoption; but if an injury
can be proved to be the effect, I know of no law, by which, consistently
with the strict right of the previous author, such use can be
pronounced to be admissible.
16
,
The new hierarchy between original works and derivative uses bolstered
this view. An abridgment, for example, was for Curtis the taking of "the
property of the original author" that could not be justified by "any amount of
learning, judgment or invention, shown in the act by him who thus
appropriates the property of another.' 68 Curtis combined the concepts of a
protected intellectual work, market profits, and a hierarchy between an original
and a derivative in order to doom the abridgment: "When we consider the
incorporeal nature of literary property, it will be apparent that no writer can
164. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 237-38.
165. Id. at 24o.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 240-41.
168. Id. at 271.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
make and publish an abridgment, without taking to himself profits of literary
matter which belong to another. ,16,
The conceptual counterpart of the rising concern about protecting profits
from derivative markets was a notion of the work as a mysterious intellectual
essence that kept its identity despite ephemeral changes of form. The
protection was, after all, for "all the profits of publication which the book can,
in any form, produce."17° From the "profit in all forms" argument emerged the
modern notion of the work as a shape-shifter-an elusive intellectual entity
that could assume an infinite number of concrete forms. In the words of
Curtis,
The property of the original author embraces something more than
the words in which his sentiments are conveyed. It includes the ideas
and sentiments themselves, the plan of the work, and the mode of
treating and exhibiting the subject. In such cases, his right may be
invaded, in whatever form his own property may be reproduced. The
new language in which his composition is clothed by translation
affords only a different medium of communicating that in which he
has an exclusive property ... .
This mutually reinforcing relationship would continue to haunt modern
copyright law. The urge to protect all market value in ever-expanding
derivative markets informed the definition of the work as a permanent essence
that could assume many forms. In turn, the notion of multiple forms
considered to be instances of the same intellectual essence fieled the process of
defining an increasing number of markets as derivative markets for the original
work.
The reflection of this conceptual change in copyright doctrine was gradual.
It began in the 183os, and Justice Joseph Story was again one of the most
influential figures behind it. Justice Story subtly attacked the traditional rules
shielding secondary uses of copyrighted works. In his 1836 Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence, he repeated the English rule that "bona fide quotations...
or a bona fide abridgment ... or to make bona fide use of the same common
materials in the composition of another work"'7 was not an infringement.
169. Id. at 275-76.
170. Id. at 237-38.
i7i. Id. at 292-93.
172. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 214 (1836).
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Nevertheless, he observed that what constitutes a bona fide use of this kind
was "often a matter of most embarrassing inquiry.""'
Justice Story began to elaborate his new vision of copyright in the 1839 case
Gray v. Russell.'74 In his opinion, Justice Story undermined the old rules by
holding that "[a]lthough the doctrine is often laid down in the books, that an
abridgment is not a piracy of the original copyright; yet this proposition must
be received with many qualifications."' 75 This holding pushed the outer limit of
copyright protection beyond verbatim reproduction by subjecting the strong
rule shielding secondary uses to qualifications and uncertain inquiries. The
decisive development came a few years later in the 1841 holding in Folsom v.
Marsh."76 In Folsom, Justice Story introduced into American copyright law the
concept of fair use. Ironically, the fair use doctrine is commonly celebrated
today as one of the major safeguards against overexpansion of copyright
protection. At the time it was introduced by Justice Story, however, it was a
vehicle for a radical enlargement of the scope of copyright. 7 The introduction
of fair use fundamentally changed copyright's baseline. Formerly, infringement
was limited to near-verbatim reproduction and all other subsequent uses were
considered legitimate. In the new fair use environment, all subsequent uses
became presumptively infringing unless found to be fair use.
With Justice Story skillfully undertaking this transformation, one hardly
notices that he was radically changing the framework of copyright, as he was
citing old precedents. Yet Justice Story was obviously quite aware that he was
expanding the scope of copyright well beyond the traditional right of printing
copies. "So, in cases of copyright," Justice Story explained, "it is often
exceedingly obvious, that the whole substance of one work has been copied
from another, with slight omissions and formal differences only, which can be
treated in no other way than as studied evasions."''  His interest, however, was
in another brand of cases where "the question of piracy, often depend[s] upon
a nice balance."'' 79 Justice Story replaced the per se rule, which protected
173. Id.
174. 10 F. Cas. 1035 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
175. Id. at 1038.
176. 9 F. Cas. 342 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). See generally R.
Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and
Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 47, at 259 (describing the
background of Folsom and its significance).
177. See John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAvis
L. REV. 465, 481 (2005); Bracha, supra note 27, at 326-29.
178. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
179. Id.
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secondary uses with a complex inquiry that became the basis of the modern fair
use doctrine. Where formerly a use which was not a copy was not infringing,
now courts had to consider
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other; the
nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each
work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to
have resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have
exercised the same common diligence in the selection and arrangement
of the materials.18°
Justice Story's fair use rule fundamentally changed the baseline of
copyright protection. Contrary to the traditional approach, now it became
unnecessary "to constitute an invasion of copyright, that the whole of a work
should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in form or in substance.
'1,8
Instead it was enough that "so much is taken, that the value of the original is
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an
injurious extent appropriated by another. ", 8,
In the decades that followed, this new broader understanding of copyright
protection gradually took over.183 After the Civil War, three overlapping
developments intensified this trend. First, through a combination of judicial
decisions and legislative amendments, the traditional rules that sheltered
subsequent uses, such as abridgments 84 or translations,18 gradually declined
and were abolished. Second, the scope of copyright protection and the tests for
infringement were expanded well beyond verbatim copying and came to cover
18o. Id.
181. Id. at 348.
182. Id.
183. See Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1166 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4095) (holding that "the
true inquiry undoubtedly is, not whether the one is a facsimile of the other"); Greene v.
Bishop, lo F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (Clifford, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763); Webb
v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511, 519 (Woodbury, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323);
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
184. The final formal reversal of the safe haven for abridgments occurred in Lawrence v. Dana, 15
F. Cas. 26 (Clifford, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
185. An exclusive translation right was added by a statutory amendment in 1870. Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
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increasingly abstract and remote zones of similarity to the protected work.' s6
Third, statutory amendments gradually added new entitlements to copyright
protection that had little to do with the traditional right to print. The right of
dramatization was recognized in 1870.87 A public performance right first
appeared in a limited form that protected only dramatic compositions, but
gradually extended to other works. 88
Two interrelated elements that were completely absent from copyright's
doctrine at the beginning of the nineteenth century were embedded in these
massive doctrinal changes. First, copyright was no longer a limited commercial
privilege to engage in a specific economic activity-the printing of a text.
Instead, it moved much closer to the ideal of ownership as general control over
an object of ownership. In practice, copyright would never reach this ideal of
ownership as absolute control over the object of property (no property right
creates such absolute control). Yet copyright increasingly approached the status
of generalized control. Copyright came to confer on the owner a broad set of
powers to dominate numerous aspects and uses of the intangible object of
property. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the accumulation of specific
entitlements and the expanding scope of protection would lead to the
emergence of a general logic of derivative works in copyright thinking. Under
this mode of thinking, copyright would be conceived of as the right to control
any aspect of the intellectual work, irrespective of medium, format, or form.'
8 9
Second, underlying the new doctrine was an understanding of copyright's
object of property -a postulated intellectual object that would become known
as the 'work." The concept of the work combined the two authorship-based
strategies introduced earlier in the century in order to justify expansion of
protection.
The first strategy was the increasingly rigid hierarchical distinction
between originals and derivatives. The early tendency to accord works based on
others a status of independent beneficial works in their own right consistently
declined. As one court remarked in 1869, "[I]t is difficult to acquiesce in the
186. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Goodwin, 93 F. 665 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1899); Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F.
846, 849 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No.
3552).
187. Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
188. The 19o9 Copyright Act protected not only the public performance of dramatic and musical
compositions, but also the public delivery of a "lecture, sermon, address, or similar
production." The already existing prohibition on dramatization blocked another avenue for
public performance, although a public reading of a non-dramatic work was arguably still
permissible. See Act of Mar. 4, 19o9, ch. 320, § i(b)-(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075.
i8g. Bracha, supra note 27, at 354-73.
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reason sometimes given, that the compiler of an abridgment is a benefactor to
mankind, by assisting in the diffusion of knowledge."' 90 The new attitude was
to reduce the secondary work to a mere derivative that does not share the all
important virtue of originality. No one captured this new attitude better than
Eaton Drone. "[T]he translator," Drone wrote, "creates nothing" but merely
"takes the entire creation of another, and simply clothes it in a new dress."' 9 '
Similarly,
[t]he dramatist invents nothing, creates nothing. He simply arranges
the parts, or changes the form, of that which already exists .... [I]n
making this use of a work of which he is not the author, he avails
himself of the fruits of genius and industry which are not his own, and
takes to himself profits which belong to another.' 92
The second strategy was based on the disappearance of the notion of the
"copy" and the rise of its replacement: a concept of the intellectual work as an
intellectual essence that could assume a manifold of forms. Again, Drone
supplied the most eloquent elaboration of this outlook:
The definition that a copy is a literal transcript of the language of the
original finds no place in the jurisprudence with which we are
concerned. Literary property, as has been shown, is not in the
language alone; but in the matter of which language is merely a means
of communication. It is in the substance, and not in the form alone.
That which constitutes the essence and value of literary composition
... may be capable of expression in more than one form of language
different from that of the original. 193
This notion of the work as an intellectual essence capable of being
expressed in a manifold of "dresses" can be found everywhere in late
nineteenth-century copyright law. The American Law Review, for example,
wrote in 1869 that the case of Daly v. Palmer "may be said to advance in literary
law the doctrine of romantic equivalents, analogous to the doctrine of
19o. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 59 (Clifford, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No.
8136).
191. DRONE, supra note 71, at 451.
192. Id. at 464.
193. Id. at 451.
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mechanical equivalents of the patent or mechanical law." 94 In Daly, Judge
Blatchford ruled that "[t]he original subject of invention, that which required
genius to construct it and set it in order, remains the same," even when an
adapted play is "performed by new and different characters, using different
language."' 9s In Maxwell v. Goodwin, the court explained that "the author of a
literary composition may claim it as his own in whatever language or form of
words it can be identified as his production. ,,96 Drone offered the most lucid
account of the new concept of the work:
So an intellectual production may be expressed in any number of
different languages. The thing itself is always the same; only the
means of communication is different. The plot, the characters, the
sentiments, the thoughts, which constitute a work of fiction, form an
immaterial creation .... The means of communication are manifold;
but the invisible, intangible, incorporeal creation of the author's brain
never loses its identity. 97
These developments in copyright law stood in considerable tension with a
former explicit premise of the field, according to which the unique contribution
of an author and therefore the focus of copyright protection was the specific
form or language in which he clothed his abstract ideas. The upshot of this
premise was not just the limited scope of protection, but also an explicit
principle that copyright protection extended only to concrete texts rather than
to the knowledge or ideas embodied in them. In Britain, this argument
appeared in the cases and literature of the eighteenth-century literary property
debate.' 98 The argument was imported into the United States intact when the
country experienced its own literary property conflict in the 1834 case Wheaton
v. Peters.'9 9
This general premise of copyright conflicted with the doctrinal trends of
the late nineteenth century and the concepts underlying them. The former
194. 3 AM. L. REV. 453, 453 (1869) (citing Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868)
(No. 3552)).
19s. 6 F. Cas. at 1138.
196. 93 F. 665, 666 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1899).
197. DRONE, supra note 71, at 97-98, 384-85.
198. Bracha, supra note 27, at 202-29.
199. Id. at 296-304 (discussing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)); Meredith L.
McGill, The Matter of the Text: Commerce, Print Culture, and the Authority of the State in
American Copyright Law, 9 AM. LITERARY HIST. 21, 28 (1997).
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envisioned copyright's object of property as concrete and stable forms of
expression. The latter constructed the protected work as a shape-shifter that
could assume an infinite number of concrete forms. The striking fact is that
these two opposing images continued to coexist within copyright law. When
Curtis, for example, discussed the question of common law copyright in his
treatise, he employed a version of the familiar notion of copyright's limited
scope:
The author of every original literary composition creates both the
ideas and the particular combination of characters which represents
those ideas upon paper.... As soon as publication takes place, it is no
longer his object or intention to retain to himself the intellectual
appropriation and enjoyment of the ideas themselves. What he does
seek to reserve, is the exclusive multiplication of copies of the
particular combination of characters, which exhibits to the eye of
another the ideas that he intends shall be received.2° °
By the time he arrived at discussion of the actual doctrines that defined the
scope of copyright protection, Curtis provided a radically different picture.
Here, the relevant object of property in which rights subsisted was the ever-
expanding work that encompassed many forms:
However imperfectly the subject may have been regarded in former
times, it is now, I think, to be regarded as settled, that whatever is
metaphysically part or parcel of the intellectual contents of a book, if
in a just sense original, is protected and included under the right of
property vested by law in the author; and it is very material to observe,
that the arrangement, the method, the plan, the course of reasoning,
or course of narrative, the exhibition of the subject, or the learning of
the book, may be, according to its character, as much objects of the
right of property, as the language and the ideas."'
The dominant trend in copyright doctrine was toward the second vision of
copyright protection. As in the case of originality, however, this is only half of
the story. The other half is that at the same time the premise that copyright
was limited to concrete expressions survived and thrived. In fact, the more the
protected work was unmoored from any concrete form, the more the principle
200. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 11-13.
201. Id. at 273-74.
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that copyright protection was limited to concrete expressions and did not
extend to any ideas or knowledge was invoked.
The principle that the object of property in copyright was the concrete
language of the protected text had been circulating in the United States since
Wheaton v. Peters and had a lineage that extended back to the eighteenth-
century English literary property debate. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, a new variant of this principle appeared. It was expressed in a set of
rules that denied the protectability of knowledge or ideas, acquired new
meaning, and achieved an unprecedented status.
In 1879 the seminal case Baker v. Selden expressed the new version of the
principle that copyright does not extend to knowledge." 2 The plaintiff in the
case had published a book explaining a new bookkeeping system. He argued
that defendant's reproduction of certain blank forms that closely resembled
examples supplied in his book constituted a copyright infringement. Justice
Bradley rejected this claim. He declared that "the truths of a science or the
methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, an author has
the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way.''2°3
Bradley went on to explain that "there is a clear distinction between the book,
as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate. 20 4 The essence of "the
teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art," he wrote, "as
embodied and taught in a literary composition or book ... consists only in
their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright.20°5 The
"knowledge" itself, on the other hand, is not part of the protected work.
The 1899 case of Holmes v. Hurst ° 6 involved a rather idiosyncratic
application of what would be later known as the idea/expression dichotomy,
but it supplied one of the most eloquent articulations of this rising rule. The
court used the distinction between ideas and expression as a means to find that
2o2. loi U.S. 99 (1879). See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Story ofBaker v. Selden: Sharpening
the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra
note 47, at 159 (describing the background and significance of Baker). As Pamela Samuelson
explains, the heart of the Baker decision was not identical to the modern idea/expression
dichotomy. While the latter is based on the notion of levels of abstraction, Baker is premised
on the principle that copyright does not extend to functional knowledge or subject matter.
See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its
Protection, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1921 (2007). Despite this important distinction, for my purposes
Baker and the idea/expression dichotomy are members of the same family of rules and cases
that express the claim that copyright does not monopolize knowledge, information, or ideas.
203. Baker, iol U.S. at loo-ol.
204. Id. at 102.
2os. Id. at 104.
2o6. 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
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a monthly publication in a newspaper of The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table,
written by Oliver Wendell Holmes (the father of Justice Holmes), constituted a
prior publication that invalidated any subsequent attempts to meet the
statutory formalities and obtain a copyright in the book as a whole. It defined
the scope of copyright protection in the following way:
The right thus secured by the copyright act is not a right to the use of
certain words, because they are the common property of the human
race, and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or
sunlight; nor is it the right to ideas alone, since in the absence. of
means of communicating them they are of value to no one but the
author. But the right is to that arrangement of words which the author
has selected to express his ideas.20 7
The emerging idea/expression dichotomy and other late nineteenth-
century decisions that declared that copyright protection did not extend to
knowledge were probably inspired by the older principle limiting protection to
concrete expressions-a principle that had been stated occasionally since the
literary property debate. There were, however, important differences between
the two. The two principles operated in the context of a very different set of
assumptions about copyright. The meaning of each component in a semantic
system is determined by, inter alia, its relations to the other components in the
system,2"' and the semantic environment of American copyright underwent a
radical change between 18oo and 19oo.
The early version of the idea/expression dichotomy developed in a context
that was still rooted in the traditional notion of copyright as the limited right to
print a copy. Thus, the early claim that the object of property was specific
language could rely upon the background assumption that copyright merely
prevented others from reprinting verbatim the exact language and did not
restrict any other uses.2 09 Moreover, this early distinction between ideas and
expression was not primarily preoccupied with the social circulation of
207. Id. at 86.
208. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM 26 (Mathew Ward & Richard Howard
trans., 1983) ("[A] system of signs is not founded on the relation of a signifier to a signified
... but on the relation among the signifiers themselves ...."); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 113 (Charles Bally, Albert Sechehage & Albert Riedlinger
eds., Roy Harris trans., 1986) ("A language is a system in which all the elements fit
together, and in which the value of any one element depends on the simultaneous
coexistence of all the others.").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 16o-162.
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knowledge. Instead, the main focus both in England and the United States was
the adequacy of a newly postulated intangible object to serve as an object of
property like any other. Identifying copyright's object of property with specific
language endowed it with a concrete semimaterial character that could be
squared with dominant notions of property."' While the separate concern
about the threat copyright might pose to the free circulation of knowledge in
society did begin to emerge in this early stage, especially in England,21 ' the use
of the idea/expression dichotomy as a cure for this rising threat was secondary.
When Justice Wiles explained in Millar v. Taylor that "all the knowledge,
which can be acquired from the contents of a book, is free for every man's use
... but multiplying copies in print is a quite distinct thing from all the book
communicates, ' it was a secondary issue to the question of intangibles as
objects of property. When Justice Thompson pointed out in Wheaton v. Peters,
more than sixty years later, that "[t]he purchaser of the book has a right to all
the benefit resulting from the information or amusement he can derive from
it,, 213 it appeared almost an afterthought.
The new insistence of the late nineteenth century on copyright's limited
scope was very different in exactly these two respects. It asserted that copyright
was limited to control of specific forms without being able to rely on the
obsolete notion of copyright as the right to multiply copies. It insisted that
copyright did not extend to ideas or knowledge in a conceptual environment
21o. McGill, supra note 199, at 28.
21. See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 840 (H.L.) ("Public utility requires, that
the productions of the mind should be diffused as wide as possible; and therefore the
common law could not, upon any principle consistent with itself, abridge the right of
multiplying copies."); Information for John Robertson Printer in Edinburgh, Defender; Against
John Mackenzie of Delvin Writer to the Signet, and Others, Surviving Trustees Appointed by the
Widow of Mr Thomas Ruddiman, Late Keeper of the Advocate's Library in Edinburgh, for Behoof
of the Daughter of the Said Mr Ruddiman and Her Husband, Pursuers (1771), reprinted in THE
LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: SEVEN TRACTS 1747-1773, at 11 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974) ("The
diffusion of learning is a matter of general concern; and it might be a means of obstructing
this, if any person who has bona fide acquired as his own property either a written or
printed copy of a book, might not transcribe, print and circulate such book at his
pleasure."); Lord Camden, Speech to the House of Lords Regarding Donaldson v. Beckett
(Feb. 22, 1774), in 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1774) 999, 1001 ("If there be any thing in the world
common to all man kind, science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they
ought to be as free and general as air or water" and "are not things to be bound in such
cobweb chains."); James Boswell, The Decision of the Court of Session upon the Question of
Literary Property in the Cause Hinton against Donaldson, etc. (1774), reprinted in THE LITERARY
PROPERTY DEBATE: Six TRACTS 1764-1774, at 25-26 (Stephen Parks ed., 1975).
212. (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 216 (K.B.).
213. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 675 (1834).
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that described the protected work in highly abstract and broad terms. Unlike
the literary property debate, in which the distinction first appeared, the new
contexts in which the distinction was used involved almost no concern about
the adequacy of the intangible object of property within a conventional theory
of property as ownership of things. Instead, the dominant issue became the
anxiety of private control over the public circulation of knowledge. Thus, the
main role of the new idea/expression dichotomy was to soothe this anxiety. It
promised that, notwithstanding the ongoing expansion of copyright
protection, all ideas and knowledge remained free.
Thus, like originality doctrine, the new version of the idea/expression
dichotomy acquired a deeply paradoxical character. It appeared exactly at the
time when the scope of copyright protection expanded to encompass an ever-
growing sphere. It acquired a dominant status at the same time that learned
accounts of copyright protection developed the notion of the work as an
abstract and fluid entity that covered a multitude of concrete forms. The
inverse correlation is striking. At the dawn of the twentieth century, a line of
cases appeared that imputed an unprecedented significance to the
idea/expression dichotomy and elevated it to the status of a fundamental tenet
of the field.214 The more abstract and broad copyright protection became, the
stronger was the insistence that it was limited to concrete expressions. The
more copyright came to resemble general control of an abstract and elusive
object that could cover a manifold of forms, the more fundamental became the
assertion that all ideas were left absolutely free for public use.
B. The Rise of the Work in Context
Similar to the process that produced the originality doctrine, the process
that gave rise to "the work" involved an interaction between the concepts of
authorship and a myriad of other interlocking influences. In the abstract image
of authorship, authors were presented as owning the intellectual works they
created-that is to say, they were seen as having absolute control over a
postulated intellectual "object." The direct doctrinal reflection of this vision-
the claim that copyright was a perpetual property right under the common
214. See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Nutt v. Nat'l Inst. Inc. for the
Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1926); London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Stodart v. Mut. Film Corp., 249
F. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). These cases would lead
to the now-classic opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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law-ultimately failed both in England21 and in the United States.216 Despite
this defeat, the conceptualization of copyright as ownership of an intellectual
work did not disappear. Arguments based on this idea constantly surfaced
within copyright doctrine. Typically such arguments were used to attack
copyright's old framework as a limited reprint entitlement and replace it with a
much broader scope of protection.
The material aspect of this process was rooted in the technological and
economic developments already discussed. The new conceptualization of the
work was closely related to the rise of a new, nationwide commercialized
publishing industry and to its increased standardization and rationalization
toward the end of the century. The growing publishing industry was
increasingly geared toward identifying and creating market demand. The new
strategies for achieving these goals included advertising, distribution, and
marketing techniques, the creation of a broad variety of new products, and
growing fine differentiation of similar products.
In 1854 George Putnam offered the same publication-Irving's works in
fifteen volumes-in the following variety of covers: cloth cover ($19); sheep
($20); half calf ($30); half morocco, gilt tops ($33); calf, extra ($37.50); calf,
antique ($40); and morocco, super extra ($48).217 Cover varieties had little to
do with the content of the work and hardly involved copyright. The example
demonstrates, however, the growing consciousness of techniques for
manipulating and creating market demand. Many other techniques for
capturing and creating demand involved what today would be called derivative
products and markets, such as abridgments, translations, and collected works
editions or serializations. Eventually this trend led publishers to see as
"derivative" markets that went beyond the realm of book publishing. The early
example of dramatization"' spread by the beginning of the twentieth century
to other sectors of the emerging entertainment industry.219 In this context,
expanding copyright protection beyond the traditional right-to-print-a-copy
paradigm became relevant to ever more powerful economic interests.
215. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
216. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591.
217. ZBORAY, A FICTIvE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 11.
218. The exclusive entitlement to dramatization was added to the Copyright Act in 1870. Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. Some doubts as to the exact scope of the
entitlement persisted, see DRONE, supra note 71, at 461-67, though these doubts were
resolved by another statutory amendment in 1891, see Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat.
1io6.
219. See Kalem, 222 U.S. 55 (motion pictures); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 2o9
U.S. 1 (19o8) (music embodied in perforated scrolls).
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A related new phenomenon was the "hit" or bestseller. Books that managed
to achieve massive popularity and unprecedented sales were a novelty. These
new bestsellers promised a broad potential for exploitation in derivative
markets. Uncle Tom's Cabin, published in 1852, was the first novel to become a
bestseller in the modern sense. It sold three hundred thousand copies in the
first year of its publication and many more before the Civil War.22 It was,
thus, no mere accident that Stowe v. Thomas was the first major (unsuccessful)
attempt to expand copyright protection to cover the derivative market for
translations.2 21 As the phenomenon of the bestseller became more common,222
the economic potential of utilizing and controlling derivative markets became
increasingly lucrative and the stakes of copyright's scope dramatically
increased.
These trends intensified in the last decades of the century. The publication
industry underwent a process of "rationalization and control." '223 There were
efforts to reign in the wild competition that characterized the industry in the
antebellum years and to increase the stability and predictability of sales as well
as prices. 24 Conscious attempts to shape products to target markets and
capture demand as well as concentration on achieving big "hits" became the
norm.225
Under such conditions, the expansion of the reach of copyright as a means
of making investment more secure and of controlling derivative markets
became a significant goal of the dominant publishers. The rise of the image of
the work as an intellectual essence encompassing a manifold of forms and of
copyright as general control of all formats and markets supplied a powerful
justification in terms of authorship and ownership for these interests.
However, for similar reasons to those discussed above, the materialist account,
220. RICHARD OHMANN, SELLING CULTURE: MAGAZINES, MARKETS, AND CLASS AT THE TURN OF
THE CENTURY 21 (1996). Widespread claims that the novel sold millions of copies before the
Civil War were recently challenged. See Michael Winship, The Greatest Book of Its Kind: A
Publishing History of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," lo9 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC'Y 309 (1999).
There is no doubt, however, that the book was sold in unprecedented numbers in the
American market.
221. See Homestead, supra note 154, at 203-04.
222. "[H]ardback sales of ioo,ooo copies and more became common in the 1890s." OHMANN,
supra note 220, at 23-24.
223. Id. at 23.
224. LEHMANN-HAUPT, supra note 84, at 259-63.
225. OHMANN, supra note 220, at 23-24. Ohmann overstates the case somewhat by claiming that
none of these developments appeared before the 189os. This is unsurprising, given that the
main argument of his book is that "mass culture" -a radically new phenomenon -appeared
only in the 189os.
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while essential, seems insufficient. Why were those interested in the extension
of copyright as a means of control of an ever-growing sphere of derivative
markets consistently victorious? Why were the arguments developed by such
interested actors overwhelmingly convincing to judges and commentators?
And what accounts for the tension-riddled structure of legal concepts in the
area?
One important intellectual influence in this field was again the modern
market concept of value and the view of the market as the sole institution for
allocating social reward.22 6 The abstract, metaphysical debates about the nature
of intellectual works were woven with concepts of and assumptions about
market value. The two sets of arguments - those dealing with the nature of the
intangible object of property and those focusing on market value -were almost
always locked together. The one informed and constituted the other. Shifting
the focus to market profit was the conceptual trigger that destabilized the
traditional notions of protection and defined the new ones. It was in the
context of the claim that "to the author belongs the exclusive right to take all
the profits of publication which the book can, in any form, produce '22 7 that
Curtis, Drone, and others developed the image of the work as an intellectual
essence that could take a manifold of forms. The metaphysical question of the
borders of an intangible work was both precipitated and answered by the claim
that the author had to collect all the market profits of his work. It was exactly
this idea that elicited Justice Story's observation that copyright came closer
than any other field to dealing with "the metaphysics of the law" 8 and
prompted him to introduce the fair use doctrine. 2 9
The 1847 case Story v. Holcombe 3' marked the transition in copyright
thought and the role played by the market concept of value. In Story, a case
which involved an abridgment of Justice Story's Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence, Justice McLean found himself between the hammer of the new
conceptual scheme, which he had already internalized, and the anvil of the old
doctrinal framework, which, for him, still held authority, if not coherence. A
master appointed by the court concluded that the work at issue was a fair
abridgment, and, accordingly, the defendant relied on the established rule that
a bona fide abridgment is not an infringement.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 130-136.
227. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 237-38.
22s. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 176-182.
230. 23 F. Cas. 171 (McLean, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
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"This controversy has caused me great anxiety and embarrassment," Justice
McLean confessed.231 The cause of his emotions was what Justice McLean saw
as a firmly established line of English precedents under which a bona fide
abridgment was not treated as an infringement. He found that he was bound
by those precedents, but he accepted the rule grudgingly. He declared that had
it been an open question, he would have felt little difficulty in finding the other
way. "I yield to it in this instance," Justice McLean said, "more as a principle of
law, than a rule of reason or justice."23
The abridgment was a particularly troubling case for anyone who came to
think of copyright in terms of protecting market value because, by definition, it
was a market substitute for the original. As Justice McLean explained,
An abridgment should contain an epitome of the work abridged- the
principles, in a condensed form of the original book. Now it would be
difficult to maintain that such a work did not affect the sale of the
book abridged.., are there not many who are able to buy the original
work, that will be satisfied with the abridgment? What law library
does not contain abridgments and digests, from Viners and Comyns
down to the latest publications. The multiplication of law reports and
elementary treatises, creates a demand for abridgments and digests;
and these being obtained, if they do not generally, they do frequently
prevent the purchase of the works at large.233
Thus, the quality that was a virtue from the perspective of eighteenth-
century judges - the abridgement's usefulness to the reading audience - was,
from Justice McLean's point of view, its chief evil. The abridgment was a
market substitute for the protected work, and, as such, it encroached upon its
value. "Now an abridgment, if fairly made," Justice McLean explained,
"contains the principle of the original work, and this constitutes its value." 34
When the effect on the market value of the original work became the focus of
copyright protection, the traditional rules allowing derivative uses lost all
coherence.
For Curtis, writing in the same year as the Story decision, this connection
between protecting market value and the scope of protection was already taken
for granted. An abridgment, he wrote, does not only injure the sales of "copies
231-. Id. at 172.
232. Id. at 173.
233. Id. at 172-73.
234. Id. at 173.
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which the true proprietor has already published, but it also interferes with his
use of his copyright, and with his power of disposing of it."23 "His copyright,"
he explained,
must be held to have secured to him the right to avail himself of the
profits to be reaped from all classes of readers, both those who would
purchase his production in a cheap and condensed form, and those
who would purchase it in its more extended and costly shape.236
By the end of the century, this form of argument would be endemic in
copyright law.
Another powerful ideological force at work behind this part of copyright
law was the republican ideal of the free dissemination of knowledge in society.
This ideal had a long lineage both within and outside copyright thought. In the
context of copyright, it went all the way back to the early eighteenth century,
when English stationers, discovering that their traditional justification of
copyright on the basis of censorship had run out of steam, turned to the new
notion of the "encouragement of learning."
23 7
In the late eighteenth-century context of American republicanism,23 8 the
ideal of the promotion of knowledge changed in significant ways. To begin
with, there was now a stronger emphasis on the broad dissemination of
knowledge and the enlightenment of all members of the citizenry (of course,
the notion of "citizenry" itself would evolve and become more inclusive over
time).39 Second, the ideal became a predominantly moral and political ideal.
The dissemination of knowledge and the free flow of information came to be
seen as an essential condition for effective political participation of citizens in
235. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 278.
236. Id.
237. See Bracha, supra note 27, at 178-83. This shift left its mark in the Statute of Anne, the full
title of which was "[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of
printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned." The preamble of the Act made a long reference to the goal of the
"encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books." 8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl.
(1710).
238. On republicanism, see generally BERNARD BAuYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); and
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
239. MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 63-67 (1990).
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the life of the polity. Moreover, these ideals were also seen as the basis of
citizens' civic virtue, without which a republic was doomed to fall into
corruption and ruin.40 Thus, the free flow of information acquired the status
of the ultimate guarantor of liberty and of a virtuous republic. A 1765 essay by
John Adams that provided a short account of the history of the West was a
striking example of these views. Adams traced the decay of Europe to the
success of tyrants in reducing "the people" to "a state of sordid ignorance and
staring timidity" and in "infusing into them a religious horror of letters and
knowledge."' 4 ' England, and particularly America, Adams described as the
antithesis of this picture of tyranny and decay:
[K]nowledge gradually spread in Europe, but especially in England;
and in proportion as that increased and spread among the people,
ecclesiastical and civil tyranny, which I use as synonymous expressions,
for the cannon and fudal laws, seem to have lost their strength and
weight. The people grew more and more sensible of the wrong that
was done them, by these systems; more and more impatient under it;
and determined at all hazards to rid themselves of it .... It was this
great struggle, that peopled America. 42
A new confidence in the dissemination of knowledge as the road of society
to both material and intellectual progress accompanied these convictions.143
Finally, some of the more radical strands of thought emphasized the broad
dissemination of knowledge as an egalitarian force that would guarantee an
equal opportunity to all members of society. 44
The ideal of the free flow of knowledge persisted in various incarnations
and variations as a major ideological force throughout the nineteenth century.
Around the American Revolution, the image of a vital sphere of broad and
unimpeded flow of information was strongly associated with the field of
printing that was about to be transformed into the publishing industry." s The
240. Id.
241. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
112 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977).
242. Id. at 113.
243. Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3, 17-21
(2001).
244. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
178o-186o, at 91-92 (1983).
245. See WARNER, supra note 239, at 4.
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ideal was embedded in a series of fundamental legal documents of the era,
ranging from the federal and state constitutions to state and federal copyright
enactments. 46 Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, it animated many
of the efforts of the movement for common schools and general education in
the United States. 7 It also inspired the mid-century proliferation of societies
for the diffusion of knowledge 48 and various initiatives such as the short-lived
American Library of Useful Knowledge. 9
Importantly, one of the chief areas where the ideal was cultivated was the
growing publishing industry. The popular self-image in the industry was a
narrative composed of a mixture of technological advancement and democratic
progress. 5 ° In 1855 one writer argued that the establishment of the first "penny
daily" was an "event, which stands out so prominently beyond and above all
others, the consequences of which, to this country and all other countries, must
be so immense, and, finally, so beneficial, that no other can be seriously placed
in competition with it." ' He went on to declare,
The Cheap Press - its importance cannot be estimated! It puts every
mind in direct communication with the greatest minds .... It is the
great leveler, elevator and democratizer. It makes this huge
Commonwealth, else so heterogonous and disunited, think with one
mind, feel with one heart, and talk with one tongue."'
In the same year, in a meeting of the Association of New York Publishers,
Reverend E.H. Chapin described the press as a "troublesome democrat," "a
revolutionist," "a prophet of free and beautiful thought," and "a working
preacher" that "tears the chained word of God from the pillars of the
monasteries and scatter[s] it all over the world, and kindle[s] a light to read it
by."2" 3 "The rumble of the power of the press is better than the rattle of
artillery," he declared, and cried to the cheers of his audience: "Advance
battalions! "'' 4
246. Birnhack, supra note 243, at 27-40.
247. KAESTLE, supra note 244, at 4-8, 78-81.
248. 1 TEBBEL, supra note 27, at 241.
249. Id. at 241-42.
250. ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 4-5.
251. J. PARTON, THE LIFE OF HORACE GREELEY, EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE 137 (1855).
252. Id. at 138-39.
253. ZBORAY, A FICTIVE PEOPLE, supra note 84, at 5.
2S4. Id.
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Thus, the ideals of broad and free dissemination of knowledge and of
information as the basis of progress and as the condition of democracy were
powerful in America dating back to the early days of the Republic. They
assumed various guises during the nineteenth century, both outside and within
copyright discourse. Yet the changing reality of actual copyright doctrine stood
in ever-growing tension with this ideal. The tension is, of course, inherently
built into a modern copyright system that creates private exclusion power over
information in the name of maximizing the free dissemination of information.
This inherent tension, however, intensified and was brought to the surface
during the nineteenth century. As copyright protection steadily expanded
beyond its formerly narrow sphere, the constraints it laid on the free flow of
information became increasingly palpable. These constraints were no longer
limited to the verbatim copier or the publisher engaged in reprinting. They
extended to a steadily expanding sphere of exchanges of information and ideas
that were now seen as derivative markets.
The United States became a society strongly committed to the ideal of the
uninhibited flow of information that developed massive mechanisms for
regulating that flow. The picture of the press as the "leveler, elevator and
democratizer" threatened to crash against the new structure of copyright as
tight and expansive regulation of the flow of information."' One early
twentieth-century court clearly articulated this anxiety:
If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expression
of certain ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or
conceptions from the stock of materials to be used by other authors,
each copyright would narrow the field of thought open for
development and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative, and
dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would be hindered by
copyright, instead of being promoted.,
6
255. Of course, there was always the reconciling argument, which is still viable today, that by
creating initial incentive copyright is, in fact, an "engine of free expression." See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). Nevertheless, the new
doctrinal and practical reality constituted a serious threat to the coherence between
copyright and commitment to the ideal of the free and broad dissemination of information.
The social cost of copyright that became more tangible and apparent had a double effect in
this respect. First, there was the very realization that there is a cost to copyright protection.
Second, given this realization, copyright threatened to become an amalgam of imperfect
compromises that had a fragile and uncertain relation to its core ideal of progress, rather
than a certain promise that, by definition, promoted that ideal.
256. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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As in the context of originality, there appeared a growing tension between
the changing framework of copyright and a fundamental ideological
commitment that held a dominant position both within and outside copyright
thought. The development of the late eighteenth-century idea/expression
dichotomy and related rules provided a mechanism for dealing with this
troubling tension. The gist of these new doctrines was the assertion that
copyright protection left the flow of ideas and knowledge completely
unimpeded. It was a way to have the cake and eat it too. The new
idea/expression dichotomy enabled courts to simultaneously claim that
copyright created full protection of market value for all forms of the work and
that the free flow of ideas and knowledge remained completely uninhibited.25 7
The dichotomy mediated and repressed the inherent conflict between the two
propositions.
As in the case of originality doctrine, the tension-reducing role played by
the idea/expression dichotomy explains the inverse proportion between the rise
of this doctrine and the general reality of copyright law. The more copyright
extended to create tighter control over the flow of ideas and the more
supportive it became of a hierarchical social structure for creating and
disseminating information, the more severe grew the tension with the
republican ideal of the free flow of knowledge. The soothing mechanism grew
in significance and strength in exact proportion to that process. The
idea/expression dichotomy became a central and defining tenet of copyright
law. As demonstrated by Curtis's insistence that an author did not retain to
himself the "appropriation and enjoyment of the ideas ''258 or a later court's
observation that copyright always leaves others free to "exploit the facts,
experiences, field of thought, and general ideas,"2"9 it was used time and again
to reiterate the image in which the author received the entire profits of his work
while all ideas remained free as the air.
257. Later in the twentieth century, this sharp binary distinction between ideas and expression
would be transformed into a blurry continuum. The seminal decision in this regard is Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). The
continuum approach continued to carry out the same ideological function as the binary
distinction, albeit as characteristic of realist and post-realist American jurisprudence, with
somewhat less assurance of precise lines discernable through technical procedures. While
the old binary distinction mitigated the dissonance with the ideal of the free flow of ideas by
implying that no ideas were monopolized, the new continuum approach did the same by
suggesting a right balance point along the continuum -an objective and prudent way that
allowed judges to split the difference between the contradictory principles of copyright.
258. CURTIS, supra note 55, at 13.
259. Eichel, 241 F. at 409.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the conflict between new commercial
interests and market ideology on the one hand and a deep commitment to the
republican ideal of the free flow of information on the other left this area of
copyright law brimming with internal tensions. The protected intellectual
work came to be seen as an abstract intellectual essence that encompasses a
multiplicity of forms, yet it was vigorously insisted that protection extended
only to concrete expressions and not to abstract ideas. The notion that
copyright created control over all derivative markets of the work became
dominant, yet the flow of information was seen as free and uninhibited. A
meager originality standard, supported by a cumulative conception of creation,
was applied as a threshold for copyright protection, yet a sharp qualitative
distinction between the original and the derivative came to dominate doctrines
that dealt with infringement.
V. OWNERS OF PROPERTY: THE WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE
The area of copyright where the broadest rift between doctrinal reality and
authorship rhetoric was formed was the rules that govern initial ownership.
The development here most resembled a gradual erosion of a strong
authorship model. Since the 178os, authors-or at least the actual creators of
works-were recognized as the persons entitled to receive copyright's initial
legal protection.26 Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century,
whenever disputes arose the actual creator was consistently preferred over
other potential claimants as the original owner of copyright.26, Around the
middle of the century, however, cracks began to appear in this firm attitude.
Gradually the default rules that allocated ownership shifted to disfavor the
actual creator. 6' This gradual change in the case law culminated in the 1909
legislation of the modern work-for-hire doctrine that explicitly vested
ownership in employers rather than the actual creator of a work. 6 3 Thus, by
that time, in the employment context, which became ever more central to
creation, copyright law reverted back to publishers' rather than authors' rights.
260. See infra text accompanying note 266.
z61. See infra text accompanying notes 271-278.
262. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 1 (2003) (describing the development of the modern work-for-hire
doctrine and the change of copyright ownership rules which resulted in an increased
recognition of employers' ownership of employees' works).
263. See infra text accompanying notes 284-292.
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There is probably no more striking example of how far modern copyright law
traveled from its supposed grounding in romantic authorship.
The description of the change of rules governing ownership as erosion of a
strong romantic authorship model must be qualified. It is somewhat
exaggerated to describe the early strict adherence to initial ownership by
authors as a strong manifestation of the ideology of romantic authorship. To
be sure, ownership of the right by authors is a basic and essential quality of a
copyright regime that purports to be founded on authorship. It is so basic,
however, that in itself it is hardly enough. Initial allocation to authors, in other
words, is a necessary but hardly sufficient condition for characterizing a
copyright regime as embodying a strong worldview of romantic authorship.
Thus, it is somewhat hyperbolic to say that early American copyright adhered
closely to romantic authorship simply by virtue of its formal insistence on
initial ownership by authors. In contrast, the later decline of this insistence and
the rise of recognition of non-authorial ownership was a clear sign of the extent
to which late nineteenth-century copyright doctrine moved from any
straightforward implementation of original authorship as a guiding principle.
By that time, even the most fundamental decree of that vision -that authors
would be the owners of the rights -was only too often ignored. How did this
happen and what can we learn from the process?
A. Ownership and the Appearance of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine
Authors had not always held the rights recognized by copyright law. In
England prior to 1710, it was stationers and only stationers that could register
copyright. 6 4 In the few known cases of copyright-like grants in the American
colonies, it was publishers or printers .who received governmental privileges. 6 s
It was only in the state grants and general statutes of the 178os that authors
were first recognized. The 179o regime, however, was already unequivocal on
this point. Authors became the principal owners of rights recognized by the
264. Whether authors had any rights vis-A-vis stationers under this framework is a complex
question. The common scholarly assertion that authors were completely ignored in the
stationers' copyright regime is inaccurate. During the century and a half of pre-171o
copyright, there emerged social norms-backed by sporadic formal enforcement of the
stationers' company-that created a measure of recognition of authors' entitlement for
compensation and, possibly, for some control over first publication. For a detailed
discussion, see Bracha, supra note 27, at 158-69.
265. Id. at 252-57.
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federal statute, while the entitlements of all other claimants such as "executors,
administrators or assigns" were clearly derivative of those of the author.2
66
The law reports from the first decades of the copyright system are not filled
with disputes about original ownership between authors and competing
claimants. This fact is, in itself, somewhat indicative. Moreover, when a trickle
of disputes in which non-authors claimed initial ownership finally arose, courts
uniformly denied such claims. Repeatedly, courts saw it as self-evident that the
person entitled to original ownership was the actual creator of the work-the
author.267 One of the earliest cases in this vein,268 which arose in the somewhat• 26,
unique context of engravings, involved a classic collaborative creation. A
plaintiff who commissioned various craftsmen to execute the design, drawing,
and engraving of an ornamented version of the Declaration of Independence
for the hefty sum of four thousand dollars obtained copyright registration and
attempted to sue an alleged infringer. The court, however, found that "neither
the design, nor general arrangement of that print, nor the parts which
composed it, were the invention of the plaintiff, '27 ° but rather of the various
craftsmen employed. Thus, it did not hesitate to deny copyright protection.
Similarly, other cases from this era did not involve direct confrontations
between authors and other claimants. These cases, rather, came in two
configurations. The first involved lawsuits by authors who created the work as
employees or from whom works were commissioned against alleged infringers.
In these cases, courts simply assumed that such authors, as long as they made
no express assignment, were the owners of the rights. z In the second group of
266. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
267. Fisk, supra note 262, at 16-25.
268. Binns v. Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 1424).
269. The context of engraving was unique because such works were protected under separate
language added to the copyright statute in 1802. The court's reasoning was grounded in that
specific language, which referred to any person "who shall invent and design, engrave, etch
or work, or from his own works and inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved,
etched or worked, any historical or other print or prints." Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2
Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
270. Binns, 3 F. Cas. at 424.
271. Most of the early cases involved two fields in which employment or commission were
common: law reporting and theatrical adaptations. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 667-68 (1834), in which the court assumed that a reporter of the Supreme Court was
the author and owner of his reports, unless he assigned his rights to a proprietor; Heine v.
Appleton, 11 F. Cas. 1031 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) (No. 6324), in which an artist who
accompanied an expedition to Japan and the China sea was denied copyright in his drawings
due to express assignment of his rights; and Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 612 (Nelson, Circuit
Justice, C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 8395), which found that an express assignment by both
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cases, employers or persons who commissioned works tried to sue infringers.
Courts denied that such persons were the owners of the copyright unless
express assignment could be shown.272
Direct challenges to the ownership of creators by employers or persons who
commissioned their work hardly arrived to the courts. One rare case of this
brand was the 1846 case Pierpont v. Fowle.2 73 In this case, the court strongly
rejected an employer's claim that the assignment of the copyright in books
written by his employee entitled him to be the owner of the renewed copyright
for the additional term of fourteen years.274 The reasons for this clear favoring
of the actual creator were taken right out of the vocabulary of original
authorship. "It was the genius which conceived and the toil which compiled
the book that is to be rewarded," Judge Woodbury wrote, "and no one ever
dreamed that an assignee could alone take the second or extended term, unless
he has paid for it, [and] clearly contracted for it. '2 7s An opposite conclusion
would be a law that "aids those kinds of patrons, who fatten on the labors of
genius.17 6 Copyright, the basic justification for which was rooted in the vision
of romantic authorship, seemed to allow no other conclusion.
It is somewhat speculative to infer from formal law to actual social practice.
Nevertheless, the limited current knowledge of early publishing practices
seems to suggest that, other than in exceptional areas such as cartography, 77
state legislation and specific contract vested initial copyright ownership not in the reporter
but in the state of New York.
272. De Witt v. Brooks, 7 F. Cas. 575 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 3851); Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 F. Cas.
195 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 640) (recognizing a theater manager who commissioned an
opera adaptation as the copyright owner only due to his deep involvement in the creation
process).
273. 19 F. Cas. 652 (Woodbury, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152).
274. Copyright duration at the time consisted of fourteen years and an additional term of
fourteen years subject to renewal by the author. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Star. 124,
124 (repealed 1802).
275. Pierpont, 19 F. Cas. at 659-60.
276. Id. at 66o.
277. While it was customary for a map publisher to claim the copyright, the actual contribution
of publishers to the creative process varied. It ranged between active involvement in the
surveying and drafting to a mere supervisory role. The answer to the crucial question of
whether there existed express assignment from all the contributors to the creation of the
map is somewhat obscure. There are, however, reasons to believe that often initial
ownership by the publisher was simply assumed. See Fisk, supra note 262, at 26-31. At least
one case formally recognized that initial ownership of a map resided in the publisher, even
in the absence of express assignment. Commonwealth v. Desilver, 3 Phila. 31 (D. Pa. 1858).
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authors were usually the initial owners of copyright as a matter of both
doctrine and social practice.278
In the second part of the century, first cracks began to form in the uniform
front of initial allocation of rights to authors. More cases of direct disputes
between authors and other claimants over initial ownership began to appear. In
some of these cases, courts adhered to the traditional view that, absent express
assignment, the author was the owner.2 79 The early challenges to this guiding
principle were indirect and subtle. Thus, the 1861 case Keene v. Wheatley, which
recognized the rights of a theater owner in an adapted play produced by one of
her actors, was based not on copyright doctrine but on equitable principles.28°
Wrapped in the formalistic distinction between copyright and equitable rights,
however, was a radically new proposition. Since the employee created the
adaptations "in the course of his willing performance of this duty," the court
278. A quick look at the record of registered copyrights during the regime's early years shows
that many of the persons who obtained initial copyright registrations were not the authors
of the relevant works, but rather "proprietors." Throughout the decade, proprietors
registered 46.6% of copyrights. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION:
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 236
(2005). This, however, does not necessarily mean that in the majority of these cases authors
were simply ignored and others were the owners of the original rights. It is plausible that
many of these cases involved pre-registration assignment by the author. In such cases,
despite the formal initial registration to the proprietor, the author was the owner and
beneficiary of the original right both in the formal-legal and the practical sense. Direct
evidence on this issue is somewhat lacking. The main indication of a common practice of
pre-registration assignment is that in most, although not all, of the cases in which copyright
was registered for a proprietor, there was also an explicit reference in the record to the name
of the author. Of course, there is a gap between mentioning the name of the author and
insisting on authorial assignment before registration. The former, however, provides some
indication. This issue will remain ambiguous until early copyright registration practice is
reconstructed. See generally FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 82 (transcribing
federal copyright registrations from the first decade of the federal regime); Felcone, supra
note 82 (transcribing New Jersey copyright registrations from 1791 to 1845).
279. Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 169i). A federal court in
Massachusetts, deciding a case that involved the same dispute, was somewhat more
ambiguous. While holding that the mere fact of employment as an actor and stage manager
did not constitute assignment, it left open the hypothetical question of whether initial
ownership would shift through a contract to write a play. Roberts v. Myers, 20 F. Cas. 898,
899 (C.C.D. Mass. 1860) (No. 11,9o6).
280. 14 F. Cas. 18o, 186-87 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7644). The court found that the additions to
the existing play were not copyrightable. Id. at 186-87. Nevertheless, it decided that the
plaintiff had equitable rights against third parties who procured the additions from her
employee-actor who was the person who created them. Id.
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reasoned, the employer "became the proprietor of them as products of his
intellectual exertion in a particular service in her employment. '281
The most important doctrinal development in this area was a shift toward
analyzing initial ownership disputes in terms of implied intent. The early cases
stated clear per se rules that vested ownership in authors. By contrast, courts in
the second part of the century decided such cases using the vocabulary of the
intent of the relevant parties as implied in the relationship between them. This
was the case in the Keene decision that relied on a series of new contract and
trade secret cases to deduce the "duties of theatrical performers to their
employers. ''282 The court analyzed the allocation of rights and duties as
somehow embedded in the employment relationship between the parties. By
the same token, implied intent became the main axis of formal copyright
doctrine in this area. Whether a specific court ended up allocating ownership to
the author or moved toward ownership by the employer the issue was decided
on the basis of implied intent. Thus the highly influential dictum of the 1869
case Lawrence v. Dana, which vested initial ownership in the person who
commissioned a work, relied on the proposition that "the title to the same
vested in the proprietor ... as necessarily implied by the terms of the
arrangement."23 The court explained that "an equitable title may vest in one
person to the labors of another, where the relations of the parties are such that
the former is entitled to an assignment of the production. ,,284 Other cases of the
era that adhered to the traditional rule of author's ownership cast their analysis
in similar terms.28s
281. Id. at 187.
282. Id. at 186.
283. 15 F. Cas. 26, 51 (Clifford, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
284. Id. The allocation of ownership away from the author was dictum in this case because there
existed an express contract in which the commissioning party agreed not to make further
use of the work with no express authorization from the author. See Donaldson v. Wright, 7
App. D.C. 45, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1895) (denying a claim by a census compiler that he had an
equitable right to prevent the publication by his governmental employer of a "mutilated"
version of his work). The court based its rejection of the employee's claim on "the nature of
the work, and the well-understood power of supervision and control under which it was
performed" and found that "[t]he power of revision, alteration and omission by the
superior, was necessarily implied in the nature of the work performed by the subordinate."
Id.
285. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888) (basing a reporter's copyright ownership in
his reports on "a tacit assent by the government to his exercising such privilege"); Root v.
Borst, 36 N.E. 814, 814 (N.Y. 1894) (inferring the author's ownership from the terms of
employment).
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The final demise of employee ownership arrived at the dawn of the
twentieth century. It occurred almost simultaneously on the case law and the
legislative fronts. A new line of cases appeared toward the end of the
nineteenth century in which defense claims by alleged infringers that the
plaintiff who was not the author of works created by employees was not the
proper initial owner of copyright were flatly rejected.286 Gone was the
traditional rule according to which, in the absence of assignment, the author
was the owner of the copyright. Similarly, the practice of framing the question
in terms of the implied intent of the parties either was marginalized or
disappeared altogether. Instead, courts stated a new default rule of employer
ownership. This new rule was grounded in the degree of involvement of the
employer's representatives in the creative process, in the supervision exercised
or in the expenditure undertaken by it.
From this point, the way was short to the next stage, which involved cases
of direct confrontations between authors and the entities in whose employment
or commission they had created the work. Early twentieth-century courts took
the last step and declared a firm default rule that allocated ownership in such
contexts away from the author. 87 One court phrased the rule in terms of the
burden of establishing ownership. It held that "when an artist is commissioned
to execute a work of art.., the burden of proving that he retains a copyright in
the work of art executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests
heavily upon the artist himself."2 8' Whether in terms of burden of proof or as a
straightforward ownership default rule, courts moved to openly side with the
employer or the commissioning person.
A parallel move occurred almost simultaneously on the legislative front. In
the conferences of interest groups that led to the Copyright Act of 1909, the
representatives of several publishing industries pressed their need for an easy
mechanism of obtaining both initial ownership and the right of renewal. 8 9
Assignment, they argued, was too burdensome and sometimes infeasible,
286. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Edward Thompson Co. v.
Am. Law Book Co., 119 F. 217, 219-20 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902); Mut. Adver. Co. v. Refo, 76 F.
961, 963 (C.C.D.S.C. 1896); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466, 468 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1885).
287. Nat'l Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911); Dielman v. White, 102
F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 19oo); Colliery Eng'r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch., 94 F. 152,
153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
288. Dielman, 102 F. at 894.
289. Fisk, supra note 262, at 63.
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especially when works prepared by numerous contributors were involved.29 °
These demands resulted in an innocent-looking short provision with
potentially far-reaching consequences. 91 "The word 'author,"' section 62 of the
19o9 Copyright Act provided, "shall include an employer in the case of works
made for hire."' 92 The significance of this prose was that an employer was
recognized as the owner of employee works and enjoyed all copyright
entitlements.
By 19o9, the rule of initial ownership in the employment context was
completely flipped. It was now employees, and often independent contractors,
who created works who had to point to an express contract that assigned them
copyright ownership. In the absence of such a contract, initial ownership was
vested in someone else. At the dawn of the twentieth century, even the most
fundamental feature that one would expect to find in an authorship-based
copyright regime-that authors would be the legally recognized owners-
disappeared in the context in which an ever-increasing number of the most
valuable works was created. Only too often, authors were no longer owners.
B. Ownership in Context
Pressures to locate the legal entitlements to economically exploit works in
hands different from the ones that created them were, of course, as old as
copyright. In the pre-authorship era in both England and America, the outlet
for these pressures was quite straightforward. The economic privileges to
exploit a work were granted directly to the person who was seen as being in the
best position to utilize them. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this
290. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 56 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe
Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATVE HISTORY].
291. The discussion here brackets the question of the actual distributive effects of the work-for-
hire doctrine. As John Witt explains, one cannot infer any specific actual distributive effects
simply from a formal legal allocation of entitlements, especially when the' relevant rule is a
default rule around which parties can theoretically contract. See John Fabian Witt,
Rethinking the Nineteenth Century Employment Contract, Again, 18 LAw & HIST. REV. 627, 635
(2000). For the purposes of this Article, suffice it to say that shifting initial allocation to
employers was a significant ideological change, whatever its actual distributive effects. That
said, there seem to be compelling preliminary reasons to assume that initial ownership rules
in this area were "sticky defaults" - rules that parties were less likely to consider and contract
around ex ante. Thus, these rules were likely to be entitlements with substantial distributive
effect. See Fisk, supra note 262, at 5o-51.
292. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 62, Is Stat. 1075, 1o88.
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person was a publisher or a printer rather than the author.2 93 Copyright was
openly and in the most direct sense a publisher's right.
When authorship ascended in the eighteenth century, this arrangement lost
its legitimacy. If the ideology of authorship demanded anything, it was that
authors would be the actual owners of their works. The pressure for locating
control in the hands of those who could best economically exploit the work did
not dissipate, however. The mechanism that was used to mediate these two
conflicting demands may look too obvious to mention. Assignabilty allowed
initial ownership by authors, on the one hand, and reliance on market
transactions to transfer the work to those who were best situated to exploit
them, on the other. There was, of course, nothing inevitable about assignabilty.
Indeed, some continental countries ended up significantly limiting the
alienability of at least some of the rights they awarded to authors.2 94 In
England and the United States, however, assignability was the unquestioned
norm. It seems this happened through the force of inertia. There were no great
debates about the assignability of copyright. When the Statute of Anne created
authors' copyright in England, there was already more than a century of
tradition in which publishers' copyright had been treated as any other
commodity. Stationers sold, bought, and mortgaged their copyrights and
assigned shares in them.2 9 When the familiar publishers' right was extended
to authors in 171o, no one thought to question or even to consciously
contemplate this feature. When the United States created its authors' copyright
regime in 1790, it imported wholesale the British institutional framework,
again with little conscious consideration of this feature. Assignability was
simply there as what copyright had been for more than a century. In the new
293. In England, pre-1710 copyright was based on the guild apparatus and as a rule was limited
to stationers -the publishers of the day. See Bracha, supra note 27, at 129-46. A parallel
protection mechanism was an ad hoc royal privilege of exclusivity, known as the printing
patent. Although a few printing patents were granted to authors, the majority of them were
issued to publishers or printers. See id. at 121-29. In colonial America, the few known
privilege grants were all issued to printers or publishers. See id. at 252-56.
294. See DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 75-121 (1992). In the German case, it
seems that the strong consolidation of some authorial inalienable rights occurred in the
second half of the twentieth century. Early twentieth-century German law placed fewer
restrictions on alienability and even included a weaker and more limited version of the
American work-for-hire doctrine. See JACQUELINE SEIGNETTE, CHALLENGES TO THE CREATOR
DOCTRINE: AUTHORSHIP, COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CREATIVE
WORKS IN THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 30-31 (1994).
295. 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 364, 378 (1924); John Feather, From
Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Authors' Rights in English Law and Practice in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 1,
at 191, 197-99; Bracha, supra note 28, at 171-72.
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authorship-based system, however, it ended up being the major mechanism for
mediating the often conflicting demands of authors' ownership and economic
exploitation. The early American case law that firmly located ownership in the
hands of authors, in the absence of express assignment, was grounded in this
framework.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the pressures to locate
ownership away from authors grew, and the strain on assignability as a
mediating mechanism intensified. This mounting pressure was a result of
changing economic practices and of the growing relevance of copyright to
various branches of industry. Economic and creative projects that were based
on a collaborative effort of a large number of individuals gradually became
more common and more economically significant. Such works that involved a
collaborative multi-contributor effort included, for example, catalogs,
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and magazines. If creating a dictionary was at the
beginning of the century a one-person project, by its end it was much more
likely to be a multi-participant initiative, directly coordinated and supervised
by a publisher. Moreover, as economic activity moved from individuals to
firms, a rising share of this collaborative creation came to take place in the
employment context. Other changes in copyright law made these rising forms
of collaborative creation increasingly relevant to copyright discourse. The
steady expansion of copyrightable subject matter296 and the continuous decline
of the originality bar297 brought within the auspices of copyright many of the
economic activities that were likely to have such patterns of creation. Both
older industries like cartography and lithography and new ones such as
advertisement and magazine publishing were likely to involve collaborative
creation or a hierarchical setting and to produce a demand to locate ownership
away from the actual creators.
Interestingly, most of the cases in the mid-period of ownership rules did
not involve such industries or settings. It is possible that what influenced
judges who began to soften the hard authorial ownership rules was not so
much direct demands from these new interests as the erosion of the image of
the author produced by them.298 Against the backdrop of the economic
changes, people who created works, at least in the context of employment or
commission, appeared less like genius creators and more like hired craftsmen
or simply wage laborers. Ironically, the craftsman who collaborates with other
296. See Bracha, supra note 27, at 373-78.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
298. Another possibility, as suggested by Catherine Fisk, is that it was mainly the peculiar facts of
those few cases that most influenced their outcomes. See Fisk, supra note 262, at 7-8.
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craftsmen in the making of a "book" was exactly the image that the ideology of
romantic authorship replaced when it first arose.299
Whatever the exact motivation of judges, the mid-period cases subtly
moved away from the clear framework of initial ownership by authors subject
to express assignment. As explained, the main doctrinal vehicle for this move
was the notion of implied intent as embedded in the relationship of the parties.
Implied intent was a mediating mechanism. It allowed judges to move away
from authorial ownership without clearly saying or recognizing that they were
doing so. Implied intent obscured the conflict between the ideological demand
to allocate ownership to authors and the felt necessity to locate it in the hands
of other economic actors. It blurred the difference between a governmental
reallocation of initial ownership and the long-recognized ability of authors to
privately exercise their choice and assign their rights.3"'
Implied intent, however, could mediate the conflict only to an extent.
Toward the end of the century, as the pressures to move away from authorial
ownership continued to intensify, implied intent came under increasing strain
until it finally collapsed. The moment of the impending collapse of the implied
intent construct is epitomized by Drone's treatment of employer ownership.
Drone was the great synthesizer of copyright law. His treatise, while full of
rhetorical hyperbole, was nonetheless a model of coherence and clarity. Against
this backdrop, the employer ownership section conspicuously sticks out. There
is no way to describe it other than incoherent and confused. Within the space
of five pages Drone managed to declare the following: that the state of New
York became the owner of its law reports "by virtue of having employed and
paid the reporter";3"' that "[t]he mere fact of employment does not make the
employer the absolute owner of the literary property created by the person
employed";30 2 that "the property is in the author, unless he has consented to
299. Woodmansee, supra note 4, at 426-27.
300. This function of implied intent in the copyright context had a very similar structure to what
Duncan Kennedy saw as the central role of implied intent in "pre-classical" American private
law. According to Kennedy, the implied intent construct was frequently used in antebellum
private law in a way that blurred the distinction between public government-imposed
decisions and private individual choices. KENNEDY, supra note 144, at 157. Interestingly, like
other legal concepts, implied intent flourished in the copyright context at a time when it was
already in sharp decline in other doctrinal areas.
301. DRONE, supra note 71, at 255.
302. Id. at 257.
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part with it"; 3 0 3 that an agreement to assign "may be implied from the terms
and conditions of the employment" ;304 and that when an author is
expressly employed to write ... articles, and, especially if he be
regularly employed and paid a salary, these circumstances, in the
absence of an express agreement, will go far toward supporting, and in
some cases will be enough to establish, an implied agreement that the
publisher is to be the absolute owner of the copyright."'
The linchpin that was supposed to hold all of these possibly contradictory
statements together was implied intent. But the contradictions and the fictive
nature of implied intent were becoming only too apparent.
The final demise of implied intent through its replacement by per se rules
of employer ownership was underscored by the continuous rise of the same
economic trends that served as the background of the earlier undermining of
authorial ownership. The turn-of-the-century cases, unlike those of the
previous decades, did typically involve employers from industries such as
lithography and advertisement where the pressure against authorial ownership
was the strongest. There is yet another typical feature to those cases. In the
majority of them, the relevant employer was a corporation. Thus, the rise of
the work-for-hire doctrine was woven with the "incorporation of America, '' 3°6
with the rise of the modern business corporation as a dominant social-
economic phenomenon. Corporations were both the context where romantic
notions of authorship came to be seen as particularly inadequate and the least
likely contenders for initial ownership under the traditional scheme. The
creator in the corporate context was usually a far cry from the romantic image
of the author. Rather than an individual independent spirit producing new
ideas, he was much more likely to be a wage laborer carrying out a routine task
assigned to him and controlled by his supervisors. It was very hard to see the
industrial lithographer, for example, as a genius author entitled to
ownership.0 7
303. Id.
304. Id. at 258.
305. Id. at 259-60.
306. See generally ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND
SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE (1982) (describing the social and cultural implications of the
rise of the modem business corporation in America).
307. Thus, in the discussions leading to the 19o9 statutory work-for-hire doctrine, the initial
objection to the proposed rule by Robert Underwood Johnson on behalf of the American
Authors' Copyright League was based solely on the use of the term "author" in relation to
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At the same time, the alternative owner was possibly even less fitting. The
legal fiction of a business corporation was hardly the ideal owner within an
authorship-based copyright regime. The argument in one of the early cases
involving corporations included an objection of this kind. The owner
corporation, it was argued, "is a mere legal fiction, and not an author entitled
to copyright within the meaning of the laws of the United States, in that it is
incapable of intellectual labor, incapable of begetting children. ''3O The court
rejected the argument and explained that "[i]t sufficiently appears that
complainant's publication is the result of the intellectual labor of the editors
and compilers employed." °9 Thus, the intellectual labor of the employees,
which could not justify granting them ownership, supported the ownership of
the corporation that employed them.
This important aspect of the work-for-hire doctrine was part of a more
general move in the period's legal thinking-a move to adjust traditional legal
doctrines and categories to the new environment of corporate liberalism. As
one contemporary legal scholar put it, the new underlying assumption of
almost every legal field came to be that "corporate bodies are really like
individuals the bearers of legal rights and duties."3 ' The practical significance
of this proposition was a general trend at the turn of the century to relocate
powers and rights from the individuals composing the corporation to the
corporation itself.311 The work-for-hire doctrine, whose typical context was that
of the corporation, was yet another instance of this trend.
Was there anything left of the ideology of authorship in this branch of
copyright law after its most fundamental tenet-that authors would be
owners -was clearly abandoned? One approach by contemporary jurists was,
indeed, to openly reject romantic authorship as an anachronism and ground
legal protection in different justifications. Thus, in National Telephone News Co.
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,312 which involved a somewhat different
doctrinal context, the court explained that at the time when the copyright
regime was established, "[t]he business world, that in this day permits nothing
to escape as a means for its exploitation had not yet pressed into her service art
employers. Johnson thought that an employer "ought to be considered the proprietors and
not the author." See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 290, at 56-57. Depriving employees
of ownership in works they created was never an issue. It was only too easy to classify such
employees out of the privileged group of authors worthy of protection.
3o8. Edward Thompson Co. v. Am. Law Book Co., 1i9 F. 217, 218-19 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902).
309. Id. at 219.
31o. W.M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 LAw Q.REv. 90, 97 (1911) (emphasis omitted).
311. HORWITZ, supra note 130, at 94-100.
312. 119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902).
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and books .... In the public mind the publication of a book meant that
literature, as Literature, had received an accession." '313 Times, however, were
changing, and the court thought that the law should change with them. Should
news agencies be denied protection "against the inroads of the parasite," it
asked, "for no other reason than that the law, fashioned hitherto to fit the
relations of authors and the public, cannot be made to fit the relations of the
public and this dissimilar class of servants ?"'' 4 Its answer was unequivocal:
"We choose, rather, to make precedent-one from which is eliminated, as
immaterial, the law grown up around authorship .... ""', To some extent, such
willingness to toss authorship aside36 and find new grounds for protection
characterized other courts of the era. It is common to find judges and lawyers
emphasizing financial expenditure and appealing not to original authorship but
rather to the need to protect investment and created "value" as the basis of
copyright and related legal protections.
Yet even in the specific area of the work-for-hire doctrine, authorship
refused to disappear altogether. Rather, it kept popping up in various twisted
forms. One perverse use of the trope of authorship in the employer ownership
age was identified by Peter Jaszi as the projection of the romantic author image
on the employer rather than the actual creator.3"7 This strategy appeared in
some, although not all, of the work-for-hire cases. In Schumacher v.
Schwencke,3, 8 the court justified corporate ownership of the work on the basis
of the corporation president's involvement in the design process. The artist
who actually created the work, the court explained, "executed Schumacher's
design," and this fact "cannot defeat the copyright. The sculptor seldom
touches the marble from which his statues are carved. The fact that the brush
which embodied Schumacher's idea was held by another artist rather than by
himself cannot be important in considering a question of this character."319 All
the virtues of the romantic author were now projected from the actual creator
313. Id. at 297.
314. Id. at 300-01.
315. Id. at 301.
316. It is important to notice that the National Telephone News Co. court, despite its criticism of
authorship as an anachronism, was not willing to purge it out of copyright law. Rather, it
tried to create a new body of law, external to copyright law, which would not be bound by
such requirements.
317. Jaszi, supra note 4, at 488-89.
318. 25 F. 466 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
319. Id. at 468. Similarly, the copyright owner in Bleistein, in which Justice Holmes rhetorically
used the figures of the great masters, was a corporation. Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithiographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); see supra text accompanying notes 151-152.
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onto the employer-corporation. The mechanism that powered this strategy was
the metaphor of "agency."320 The corporation, through its managerial staff,
was clothed in the garments of the "originating, inventive, and master
mind. ' 32 The employee who actually created the work was imagined as a
mechanical extension of this creative subjectivity- merely carrying out
instructions and performing only the physical non-creative tasks. 322
Even more important than such occasional use of the authorship trope was
the survival of authorship within the very statutory arrangement of the work-
for-hire doctrine. The 1909 Copyright Act, remember, did not simply
recognize employers as the owners of their employees' works. Rather, it
designated them as "authors." '323 The temptation to read too much into this
phrasing should be resisted. Lawyers and drafters, then as today, understood
"author" in this context as a technical term of art, whose use was mainly a
drafting technique.
314
320. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276,
1297-98 (1984) (using the analogy of the machine or the mechanical extension to describe
theories of agency).
321. Schumacher, 25 F. at 468.
322. My claim that the use of authorship rhetoric in Schumacher is perverse is not based on the
assumption that the creative process never involves a "division of labor" that allocates the
crucial creative role to the designer rather than to the person who produces a physical object
embodying the design. It is based on two other arguments. First, even assuming that in the
circumstances of the case the corporation's president played the crucial creative role and the
employee's role was limited to mechanical execution, the decision did not vest the
ownership in the president but in the corporation. One way or another, the court used
authorship rhetoric in order to vest ownership in an entity different from the actual creator
or creators, a fact that is unaltered by the legal fiction of identifying managerial actions with
those of the corporation. Second, and admittedly more speculatively, reading the
Schumacher opinion leaves one with a strong impression that, at least in part, the metaphor
shaped the court's view of the roles of the contributors to the creative process. In other
words, it seems plausible that the court's predisposition to see the employee as the
mechanical extension of the corporation helped to shape its assessment of the relative
importance of the creative contributions by the president and the employee.
323. Act of Mar. 4, 19o9, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88.
324. Richard Bowker, for example, explained in this context that
[w]e notice the practical value particularly in this way, if you always have the
word "author" in the law and then provide that that author, no matter of what
class, should become the copyright proprietor when he has satisfied the
conditions that we make. In other words, everybody is an author, and the author
or his legal representative or his assign acting in the name of the author becomes
the copyright proprietor, and so on for all other provisions of the act ....
[I]nstead of the many provisions providing for what I will call subsidiary
authorship, the word "author" should be defined in a single section, which
should be absolutely comprehensive.
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Yet there was more. Several times when the work-for-hire provision,
designed to vest initial ownership in employers, was discussed in the
preparatory conference, participants expressed concern over the constitutional
limitations on copyright protection. As Samuel James Elder, speaking as an
expert copyright lawyer, explained to the participants: "When you come down
to the question of who can take out copyright you are confined by the language
of the Constitution to authors and by the broadening of the idea that the courts
have given it to the assignees of author[s]."32 Concerns about whether
employers as original owners, rather than assignees, could be covered by the
constitutional mandate continued to bother the drafters.326 When doubts were
expressed about the early language that termed the employer an author,327 it
was explained that Richard Bowker's (of the American Authors' Copyright
League) "impulse [in using this language] originated in the authority under
which Congress provides copyright laws, and that is the Constitution, and the
only term used there is 'author' and then he had to define what 'author' might
include in this act.328
The point should not be exaggerated. The drafters of the 19o9 Act were not
conspiring to create a deception by the use of the term "author." And yet,
within the flux of drafting debates and legal technicalities, the absurdity of this
aspect of the process was overlooked. Somehow it made perfect sense to the
drafters to assume that the Constitution, by using the term "authors,"
prescribed some real restrictions on the identity of the initial owner-possibly
to the degree of frustrating the attempt to vest ownership in employers -and
for the drafters then to avoid this problem by simply creating a statutory
definition of an author that included whomever they wanted. Authorship, as a
constitutional requirement, was simultaneously accorded due respect and
defined out of existence.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the interaction between the
underlying ideology of authorship and the demands of interests produced by a
dramatically changed economic-social context left the doctrinal area of initial
ownership as one of the most contradictory spheres of copyright law. The most
fundamental principle of the authorship justification of copyright- authorial
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 290, at 143.
325. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 290, at 54.
326. Id. at 56.
327. The doubts were raised by Charles Scribner, representing the American Publishers'
Copyright League. At that stage of the drafting process, the term "author" was not yet
extended to every employer, but rather to specific categories such as periodical publishers. 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 290, at 146.
328. Id.
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ownership -was now partially deserted. Authorship was almost abandoned in
this area of copyright discourse. Yet it kept springing back into existence, often
in rather perverse forms.
CONCLUSION: THE IDEOLOGY OF AUTHORSHIP REVISITED
What does it all mean? There are a few lessons to be learned from the
foregoing account -lessons about American copyright law and more generally
about the relationship between law and ideology. An understanding of the
intricate relationship that was formed in the nineteenth century between the
concept of authorship and copyright places us in a position to decipher the
ongoing significance of this relationship today. A decade ago, Mark Lemley
questioned the relevance of "romantic authorship" to analyzing contemporary
copyright. He observed that current trends in copyright law, which is "heavily
skewed to protect the interests of corporations, not individual authors"32 9 and
which is at odds with the notion of the original author in numerous other
respects,3"' cannot be understood as "the product of some eighteenth-century
vision of authorship with unfortunate consequences."3 ' Lemley is right to the
extent that one tries to explain modern copyright by projecting onto it an
abstract eighteenth-century aesthetic theory of authorship. 32
The historical account elaborated here, however, suggests a very different
way of understanding the copyright-authorship nexus. It shows that the
conceptual structure of American copyright law underwent a radical
transformation during the nineteenth century. This change was not by any
means the mere implementation of a preexisting aesthetic theory of authorship.
In fact, the abstract theory of original authorship never had a golden age in
American copyright. At the end of the eighteenth century, copyright still had
most of the institutional features of the traditional printing privilege, though it
came to be supported by a new theoretical construct of original authors as
proprietors of their intellectual creations. During the nineteenth century, as
features of this theoretical construct were gradually embedded in actual legal
doctrines and concepts, they were mediated through the influence of the
329. Lemley, supra note 26, at 882.
330. See id. at 882-86.
331. Id. at 902.
332. For an argument that the abstract aesthetic theory of original authorship was not fully
adopted even by eighteenth-century English copyright law, see Simon Stern, Copyright,
Originality, and the Public Domain in Eighteenth-Century England, in ORIGINALITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT
(Reginald McGinnis ed., forthcoming 2008).
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publishing industry, among others, as well as through various ideological
filters. These filters include a commitment to the free flow of knowledge, a
market concept of value, and a particular understanding of the legitimate role
of the state and of the judiciary. The modern structure of authorship-
ownership in copyright, as it emerged at the dawn of the twentieth century,"3
was nothing like a re-creation of copyright in the image of eighteenth-century
theory of authorship. Thus, trying to extrapolate directly from late-eighteenth-
century aesthetic theory to issues of twenty-first-century copyright law seems a
futile exercise. Rather, the place to look is the very different construct of
authorship that became part of the doctrinal and conceptual structure of
modern copyright.
When one examines authorship ideology as embedded in copyright law, it
becomes apparent that Lemley is both right and wrong. Copyright law has
many features that are diametrically opposed to the fundamental tenets of
original authorship, but at the same time it is saturated with concepts that are
directly traceable to these tenets. Modern copyright's rules of ownership often
favor corporations and other commercial entities at the expense of actual
creators of works,334 but at the same time copyright is justified on the basis of
authors' rights, and many of copyright's rules -sometimes the very rules that
deprive authors of ownership - are constructed in terms taken from the
vocabulary of authorship.33
Copyright's minimalist threshold originality requirement is but a mockery
of the romantic vision of the author as an individual spirit who creates ex nihilo
meritorious intellectual works. 336 Yet American copyright discourse adamantly
resists a "sweat of the brow" regime and clings to originality as a constitutive
feature of the field.337 Moreover, other areas of copyright law, such as the rules
that define the scope of protection, are dominated by latent assumptions
suspiciously similar to those of original authorship, namely, a sharp distinction
between a superior original and a mere derivative with substantial normative
333. I do not mean to claim that the story of authorship in copyright was over by 1900-a
mistake that I have accused some of the existing accounts of copyright history of making. I
only mean to say that by that time, many of the features of the contemporary notion of
authorship in copyright law had appeared. This is not meant to foreclose the possibility of
further changes during the ensuing century.
334. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (establishing the work-for-hire doctrine); id. § io1 (defining a
"work made for hire").
335. See supra text accompanying notes 289-299.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
337. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352-60 (1991).
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consequences attached to it.338 Copyright is at once about Justice Story's
observation that "[n]o man creates a new language for himself "'339 and Eaton
Drone's conclusion that a translator or a "dramatist invents nothing, creates
nothing, 34' a conclusion for which the doctrinal foundations were laid by
Justice Story.341
Balancing competing interests of rights-holders and users is a dominant
concern of modern copyright and of doctrines that profess to ensure the
uninhibited circulation of ideas, knowledge, and information which lie at its
heart.342 But modern copyright is also pervaded by a strong expansionist drive
motivated by a conviction that the owner is entitled to control an ever-growing
sphere of derivative markets. This drive necessarily results in restrictions upon
the access of others to information and their ability to use it freely.
The key point is that modern copyright is the whole complex amalgam of
conceptual structures described above. The framework we inherited from the
nineteenth century and that was perfected in the previous century encompasses
radically different arguments, deeply conflicting commitments, and ingredients
that stand in sharp tension and even outright contradiction with one another.
It also includes the ways in which these different parts are organized and
managed together, despite the tensions between them and the mechanisms
that enable us to go back and forth between them. This structure and the
historical account of its emergence is also the key for understanding the
ongoing role of authorship in copyright law as an ideology.
Authorship as embedded in copyright law is an ideology, first and
foremost, in the basic sense of this term.343 It is a conceptual scheme through
which we construct reality, a set of assumptions about the world and of
categories for understanding it. Authorship, however, also functions as an
ideology in the stronger sense often used in the critical tradition -namely, it is
a motivated mystification.344 It is a mystification because the representation of
authorship in some parts of copyright law is removed from the realities of
authorship. The reality of authorship - the real practice of the creative
process-has never overlapped with the premises of original authorship that
338. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 1o6(3).
339. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
340. DRONE, supra note 71, at 464.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 172-182.
342. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107.
343- On ideology as a social construct, see TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 28
(1991).
344. For a critical description of the notion of ideology as false consciousness, see id. at io-24.
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dominate some areas of copyright discourse. The practices of creating texts
today or in the past have never come close to being anything like solitary
individuals creating original works ex nihilo. The creative process, to varying
degrees in different contexts, has always been collaborative and cumulative,
involving reworking of existing materials and meanings rather than originating
completely new ones. It never entailed a sharp distinction among imitating,
borrowing or adapting, and creating new, original ideas. 345
Moreover, original authorship is a mystification because its representation
of reality is removed from the actual doctrinal arrangements of copyright law
itself. For example, copyright law is justified in terms of authorial ownership,
while its ownership rules often assign ownership away from the creator.
Copyright is presented as grounded in protecting originality and creativity,
while its actual originality requirement is technical and anemic.
But why speak of mystification when I have conceded that there is no
complete overlap between original authorship and modern copyright? Who
exactly is deceived when copyright consists of a variety of ideas and
assumptions -some in harmony with and others diametrically opposed to the
premises of original authorship? Is not authorship in modern copyright
discourse merely a harmless declaratory layer of rhetoric, a relic of bygone
times that has little influence on "real" copyright law? After all, even a cursory
look at copyright doctrine seems to confirm that romantic authorship is just
that. 46 We may sometimes still be talking about originality as the essence of
authorship and about authorial ownership. But all accept that in "real"
copyright law, originality is a minimal requirement that has little to do with
the romantic vision and that "author" is a technical legal term that may mean
some legal entity who is not the actual creator.
The point, however, is not that anyone is being deceived. Rather, the
curious and important quality of this conceptual field is the way in which it
enables us to maintain deeply conflicting images, commitments, and modes of
argument. No modern copyright lawyer is deceived into believing that
copyright law is anything like a pure model of original authorship. Yet, the
lawyer can move smoothly with very little sense of dissonance between
arguments that assume and embody very different assumptions about
authorship and about copyright protection. She can argue doctrinal questions
of originality in terms that assume a cumulative process of creation and switch
without blinking to arguing questions of infringement in terms that assume a
345. Jaszi & Woodmansee, supra note 21, at 3-4.
346. See BOYLE, supra note 4, at 157-58 (criticizing the claim that authorship is a mere
insignificant rhetoric which is not believed by anyone).
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sharp distinction between an original and a derivative. The mystification lies in
the coexistence of those conflicting fundamental assumptions and in the
mechanisms that allow us to maintain them.
This mystification is "motivated" because its patterns are not random or
arbitrary. As the historical account elaborated here shows, the specific patterns
of copyright's structures pertaining to authorship were formed during the
nineteenth century in the context of emerging economic changes and particular
social relations of power. The process was shaped by the demands of an
increasingly commodified publishing industry, the interests of business
corporations and other employers, and the rise of the media or content
industries and other copyright-related industries such as advertising. The
resultant framework of copyright bears the marks of those forces and interests.
Far from being distributed randomly, the conflicting assumptions about
authorship in copyright law are often arrayed strategically in a way that serves
these interests. On the most general level, current copyright law appeals to the
legitimizing aura of authorial property, while avoiding many of the
consequences of actual implementation of that vision.347
Mystification, power, and legitimacy, however, are not the whole story. In
order to be effective, the elements of original authorship and the mechanisms
that help reconcile them with conflicting concepts and commitments must have
some practical bite. As E.P. Thompson put it in another context,
The rhetoric and rules of a society are something a great deal more
than sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways,
the behaviour of the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may
disguise the true realities of power, but, at the same time, they may
curb that power and check its intrusions.3
4 8
347. In the extreme case of the work-for-hire doctrine, copyright law avoids even the most basic
principle that follows from an authorship-based justification, namely ownership by authors.
348. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265 (1975).
Thompson made those observations in regard to the notion of the rule of law as it developed
in eighteenth-century English criminal law, but it seems just as applicable to our context.
For a critical treatment of Thompson's view, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An
Unqualified Human Good?, 86 Y.ALE L.J. 561 (1977) (book review). Horwitz's criticism applies
not so much to Thompson's observation on the dual nature of the ideology of the rule of law
as to his further inference that the rule of law is "an unqualified human good." THOMPSON,
supra, at 266.
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The same is true of copyright law.349 Take originality, for example. For the
most part, originality has been a mechanism of mystification in American
copyright. Treating originality and creativity as fundamental constitutive
elements of copyright while reducing their actual doctrinal effects to a
minimum supported the expansion of copyright scope in ways that had little to
do with original authorship while still maintaining the force of that
legitimating ideal. When pushed to the limit, however, the pale originality
requirement showed that it still had some vitality left in it. When in 1991 the
Supreme Court declared that originality was still "[t]he sine qua non of
copyright"3 ' and denied protection to certain works, it placed some limit on
the ability of powerful commercial interest to use copyright to their advantage.
At least in some contexts, such as factual databases, this limit had real practical
and economic significance.3"' In order to be effective in disguising the realities
of power, the ideology of authorship sometimes may curb that power and
check its incursions.
One last possible objection to the claim of persisting importance of the
ideology of authorship in modern copyright is presenting it as merely a
language or a discourse capable of expressing a diverse set of views and
arguments. If authorship is the entire amalgam of conflicting concepts and
assumptions, what difference does it make if we talk this way in copyright law?
If one can use parts of it to construct diametrically opposed positions, if it
contains radically contradictory visions, such as romantic originality and
creativity as a cumulative process, does it not follow that it makes no
difference? Is it not just a depository of rhetorical resources, which could be
used in different ways and which in itself determines nothing?32
Authorship is more than a neutral language. The fact that the modern
version of ideology of authorship includes conflicting structures and
commitments means neither that it is radically indeterminate nor that it lacks
significance. While the modern ideology of authorship, as embedded in
copyright doctrines, contains these conflicting elements, the choice between
349. See Jaszi, supra note 4, at 5Ol ("Romantic 'authorship' and its connotations are deeply
embedded in legal consciousness and ... this belief sometimes expresses itself in ways that
are inconvenient, to say the least, for the commerce ofintellectual property.").
350. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
351. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (discussing the
effect of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the originality requirement on copyright
protection for informational works such as factual databases or directories).
3S2. See John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655
(1926).
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them is not completely random. Likewise, the speaker is not in a position of a
completely autonomous agent who can choose and apply, in each case,
whichever part or whichever underlying substantive commitment she prefers.
The conventional forms of the ideology of authorship, rather, have an intricate
structure of managing and allocating its different elements among various
fields of discourse and within each field.
It is entirely proper, for example, to employ a strong romantic account of
original authorship in a legislative debate about a certain amendment to the
Copyright Act. The same account would probably seem out of place when
arguing certain doctrinal issues in court. This semantic segregation exists even
within the same general field of discourse. Thus, for example, when engaged in
a doctrinal legal argument about originality as a threshold requirement for
protection, it would be most natural, indeed, necessary, to treat originality as a
narrow and technical concept. When arguing questions of derivative works,
however, a strong hierarchical distinction between originals and derivatives is
built into the very terms of the argument. In some doctrinal contexts, it is
entirely plausible to depict copyright protection as limited to a very low level of
abstraction and as leaving all ideas as free for the use of all; in others, arguing
that copyright protection is limited to a narrow set of concrete forms would be
brushing existing concepts against the grain. A court may see it as entirely
plausible to deny ownership to a contributor who had not reached the level of
an author and at the same time recognize a business corporation as the original
author-owner.
There is nothing necessary or natural about such divisions, but they
nonetheless exist as strong conventions. They are part of the construct of
authorship that was shaped by powerful forces in the past. Thus, despite its
internal tensions and conflicting ingredients, authorship does often matter.
Is the foregoing analysis of any use in trying to change copyright law? It
would be naYve, of course, to assume that simply understanding the ideological
structure of copyright and authorship will magically ensure its transformation.
The exercise nonetheless may be of some use. To begin, uncovering the
genealogy of the ideology of authorship in copyright should make us more
alert to the social power relations underlying it. No doubt, the array of interests
shaping copyright law has changed and grown more complex in the
intervening century, but many of the forces that exerted their influence in the
formative era of the nineteenth century are still with us.
Second, understanding critically the structure of this ideology may help
foster an attitude which is facilitative of its transformation. Coming to terms
with the tensions, inconsistencies, and conflicts inherent in the current system
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places one in a position which is somewhat removed from and skeptical of its
conventions .3
Third, the existing ideology can supply the building blocks or at least the
starting points for its piecemeal transformation from within. Scholars who find
the recent expansion of copyright and the shrinking of the public domain
worrisome often present the ideology of authorship as part of the problem.
Lawmakers and jurists who cling to that ideology, it is argued, tend to
exaggerate the extent to which creation is an individualist and solitary activity,
and underestimate the essential role for flourishing creativity of the ability to
freely access and rework existing materials.31 4 This may be true. It is difficult,
however, to imagine what it would mean to discard or do away with the
ideology of authorship in copyright law.3"'
Yet it is quite possible to understand what it would mean to transform or
rework it. To do so would entail a process similar to the one that occurred in
the nineteenth century. A process of transformation would begin by using the
existing ideological forms, while rearranging or reworking them and gradually
imbuing them with new meaning. The complexity of the modern ideology of
authorship and the fact that it is already filled with conflicting concepts and
assumptions assures us that the initial resources for accomplishing this task are
already there.
This, of course, will not be a mere literary task of deconstruction and
reconstruction. If the history surveyed here teaches us anything, it is that the
ideological forms embedded in copyright law are the products of social
structures of power, including economic forces, powerful commercial interests,
and political influence, among other things. Such forces and interests are not
gone today." 6 Nevertheless, given a political will, the ideological resources for
change are already there. All it takes is human agency.
353. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 18 (1975) ("[T]hrough its
workings on our self-consciousness, the practice of total criticism itself may work toward
the revision of the moral sentiments and the reorientation of politics.").
354. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 4, at 169; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 51-
52; Fisher, supra note 43, at 277-84; Lange, supra note 4, at 143.
355. Regrettably, authorship scholarship tends to ignore the question or to lapse into vague
metaphors. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 4, at 151 ("[A]uthorship in the form of creative play
will flourish ... not in the anonymity of a murmur, but as if in moments between lovers
exchanging gifts.").
356. I thank Mark Rose for helping me see this important point.
